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Part I - Germany 
 
 
A. Chapter Introduction 
“Volkswagen faces shareholder claims over emissions scandal”1 
- Reuters News, 01/28/2016 
“With Optimum Pressure - Actions for Damages against VW”2 
- F.A.Z., 09/25/2015 
The VW emissions scandal is still all over the news - and with it the pending shareholder ac-
tions against the corporation. “Global civil litigation of all stripes is growing”3 and today, 
securities fraud actions are by far no longer a “US-only” issue. 
This paper aims to show the role of private litigation in the corporate governance debate with 
a focus on German securities law and its litigation procedures. After a brief introduction to the 
topic (B.), there will be an extensive discussion of the present collective redress scheme for 
securities fraud actions in Germany and its implications on private enforcement (C.) and pos-
sible areas of conflict will be pointed out (D.). A brief summary of the most important points 
and an outlook will conclude (E.). 
 
B. Private Litigation in Germany: An Overview 
The topic of this paper is the role of private litigation. This should in turn be understood in the 
broader context of corporate governance, thus it is vital to have a definition of what corporate 
governance is. One of the most common definitions is that of the Cadbury Report: “Corporate 
governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled.”4 This definition is 
also the shortest and therefore very handy.5 Now how exactly are companies essentially con-
trolled? There are two basic control mechanisms, namely internal control from within the 
company and external control from without. External control is achieved through regulation, 
which in turn has to be enforced to be effective.6 Legal research is in agreement that there are 
                                                
1 Wissenbach, Volkswagen Emissions Lawsuit. 
2 Budras, Schadensersatzklagen gegen VW. 
3 Iwata, Securities-fraud suits go global. 
4 Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 15. 
5 See for a comparison of other definitions: Clarke, International Corporate Governance, 1-2. 
6 Dharmastuti/Wahyudi, 4:4 R.J.F.A., 132-134 (2013). 
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basically two types of regulation enforcement mechanisms namely public enforcement and 
private enforcement.7 
Public enforcement is based on an ex-ante perspective. In order to create a working market 
infrastructure, statutory regulations are passed to deter company misconduct before it hap-
pens.8 If violated, these regulations are enforced by state authorities through sanctions or even 
by means of criminal prosecution.9 
Private enforcement on the other hand is characterized by an ex-post view. Civil liability of a 
corporation for past misbehavior has a deterring effect, thus preventing repeated violation of 
statutory regulations.10 Through this deterrence effect, when suing a company, private indi-
viduals are in fact enforcing statutory regulations. This in turn means they promote a public 
interest, making them something that has become known in legal literature as “private attor-
ney general”.11 
Private enforcement mechanisms can be found in different areas of the law, most notably anti-
trust law and capital markets / securities law. Private enforcement has traditionally not played 
a big role in German anti-trust law12, though in recent years, there was a lot of effort on EU 
level concerning collective redress and reforms have been passed aiming to promote private 
litigation in the area of competition law.13 
The focus of this research however is not on anti-trust law but on securities law. Taking a 
closer look at the securities market, one will find that there is a natural asymmetry of infor-
mation in the capital market. Only the capital seeker (issuer of securities) initially has all the 
relevant company information which the capital provider (investor) needs in order to make a 
sound investment decision.14 Yet to prevent market failure, these information asymmetries 
have to be leveled out. This is achieved by creating a set of disclosure and publication obliga-
                                                
7 Arguably market control is a third mechanism inducing corporations to comply with legal requirements all on 
their own, e.g. because they rely on the trust of the market for ‘repeat transactions’. However the effectiveness of 
market control is heavily doubted, see Brellochs, Publizität und Haftung von Aktiengesellschaften, 174-176. 
8 Porrini/Ramello, 3:2 J.F.E.P., 143-144 (2011). 
9 Criminal prosecution can be seen as a form of public enforcement, even though it is sometimes listed as a sepa-
rate enforcement mechanism, see e.g.: Ramphal, The Role of Public and Private Litigation in the Enforcement of 
Securities Laws in the United States, 10. 
10 Porrini/Ramello, 3:2 J.F.E.P., 142-143 (2011). 
11 Baetge/Eichholtz, Die Class Action in den USA, 315; Reuschle, WM 2004, 966 (970); Hopt, WM 2009, 1873 
(1879-1880); Sometimes the term „private public attorney” is used, see Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (67). 
12 Buxbaum, 23:3 Berkley J. Int’l L., 484 (2005). 
13 KK KapMuG / Hess, Einl., RN 2, 54; The concept of private law enforcement in Germany was first explicitly 
taken up on in the “7th Cartel Law Novella” of 2005, see Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (67). Very recently 2014/104/EU 
directive has been passed by the European Parliament and the Council, aiming to promote private litigation. Its 
possible impact on private law enforcement in German competition law is however disputed, see Keßler, VuR 
2015, 83 (83-84, 91); For a comprehensive overview of the development of collective redress in Europe in recent 
years, see Haar, Investor protection through model case procedures (CFS Working Paper No. 2013/21),  4-17. 
14 Brellochs, Publizität und Haftung von Aktiengesellschaften, 166. 
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tions for corporations, providing the investor with the needed information.15 Thus disclosure 
obligations play a key role in maintaining a functioning capital market.16 
As with any regulation, these disclosure obligations may be publicly and/or privately en-
forced. Historically, public enforcement has always played the predominant role in the Euro-
pean Union.17 The same holds true for Germany in particular.18 Public corporate surveillance 
is achieved through a three-tier monitoring and enforcement system consisting of the German 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, 
short: BaFin), the States of Germany and the Stock Exchanges.19 
However, German Law does also provide the vehicles for private enforcement. Similar to US 
law there are possibilities for bringing either a derivative suit (Aktionärsklage) or a direct suit 
against the corporation.20 In general, derivative suits are seen as unattractive for individual 
investors.21 The main reason is that while the shareholder bears the full cost risk of litigation - 
in German Law at least concerning the approval procedure (Zulassungsverfahren), pursuant to 
§ 148 para. 6 sent. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz - AktG)22 - only the 
corporation itself profits directly from a successful trial.23 Thus the derivative suit has not 
been popularly used in Germany.24 Up until today there are only three published court deci-
sions concerning shareholder derivative suit.25 
Now this leaves the direct suit of the investor against the corporation for enforcing liability 
because of violations of disclosure requirements. In most cases it is in practice too risky while 
at the same time too expensive for an individual investor to bring a case against a company.26 
This effect, known as “rational disinterest” or “rational apathy”, in turn impedes the enforce-
ment of disclosure obligations through private individuals.27 
                                                
15 Brellochs, Publizität und Haftung von Aktiengesellschaften, 167. 
16 Brellochs, Publizität und Haftung von Aktiengesellschaften, 1. 
17 Russell, 28:14 B. U. Int’l L. J., 142 (2010). 
18 Hopt, WM 2009, 1873 (1879). 
19 Hdb. Kapitalanlagerecht, 3rd Ed. / von Rosen, § 2 RN 224-267; Claussen, Bank- und Börsenrecht / Bröcker, § 
6 RN 27. 
20 Brellochs, Publizität und Haftung von Aktiengesellschaften, 185. 
21 Ramphal, The Role of Public and Private Litigation in the Enforcement of Securities Laws in the United 
States, 12. 
22 Aktiengesetz - AktG, as of December 22 2015, BGBl. I 1965, p. 1089. 
23 KK KapMuG / Hess, Einl., RN 15. 
24 Haar/Grechenig, AG 2013, 653 (654-655, 662); Habersack, Staatliche und halbstaatliche Eingriffe in die 
Unternehmensführung,  E92; It has been suggested to institute a „bounty“-system in order to create monetary 
incentives for the suing shareholder and this way encourage more derivative suits, see Schmolke, ZGR 2011, 398 
(434-437). This approach however is not unquestioned, see (crit.) Kahnert, AG 2013, 663 (670). 
25 OLG Hamburg, AG 2007, 331; LG München I, NZG 2007, 477; OLG München, NZG 2010, 1392. 
26 Hellgardt, Kapitalmarktdeliktsrecht, 546-547. 
27 Bergmeister, KapMuG, S. 27; Hellgardt, Kapitalmarktdeliktsrecht, 546-547. 
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The most important way to counter this effect and encourage private litigation is for the legis-
lation to provide a collective redress scheme.28 Collective redress schemes enable a multitude 
of plaintiffs and/or a multitude of defendants to join together and collectively litigate in front 
of a court.29 By this way minimizing the costs and risks for individual investors, a system for 
collective redress is a prerequisite for effective private litigation.30 The following will explore 
what kind of collective redress scheme is implemented in Germany in securities and capital 
market disputes and whether or not or how it promotes private litigation. 
 
C. Collective Redress in Germany: KapMuG 
Up until today, the Zivilprozessordnung31 (ZPO) as the central code for German civil proce-
dural law provides no possibility for bringing a collective suit to court.32 This is largely due to 
the fact that German civil procedural law is traditionally based on the concept of a two-party-
process33 and since its first introduction in 1877 there was no aspiration to change the core 
principles on which the ZPO is based on.34 Especially in recent years, there have been some 
major reforms;35 however no collective redress scheme has been incorporated into the ZPO so 
far. Outside the provisions of the ZPO though, there are in certain areas of civil law possibili-
ties for collective redress, most notably the German “Capital Markets Model Procedure Act” 
(Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz36 or short: “KapMuG”), which applies to shareholder 
actions for damages (and certain fulfillment duties) in securities markets disputes.37 
The following will give a brief overview over the development of the KapMuG (I.) before 
going into the details of its procedure (II.) and analyzing its actual impact (III.). 
 
I. Development 
In 2000 and 2001, allegations were made against Deutsche Telekom AG concerning misrepre-
sentation and failure to disclose material information. The two main (albeit not the only) alle-
                                                
28 Russell, 28:14 B. U. Int’l L. J., 144 (2010). 
29 KK KapMuG / Hess, Einl., RN 1. 
30 Schäfer, Anreizwirkungen bei der Class Action und der Verbandsklage, 70. 
31 Zivilprozessordnung - ZPO, as of November 20 2015, BGBl. 2005 I p. 3202; 2006 I p. 431; 2007 I p. 1781 
32 There is the possibility under § 79 para. 2 No. 3 ZPO for consumers association to collect consumers’ claims 
and litigate in their own name those claims. This is however the only procedure that could be considered a col-
lective redress scheme, see Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (66). 
33 Langenbucher, Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht, § 21 RN 3. 
34 Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (66). 
35 Notable changes include the reform of arbitration law in 1998 as well as the ZPO reforms of 2002, 2004 and 
2009, see Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (66). 
36 Gesetz über Musterverfahren in kapitalmarkrechtlichen Streitigkeiten (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz 
- KapMuG), as of November 20 2015, BGBl. 2009 I, p. 2182. 
37 KK KapMuG / Hess, Einl., RN 3. 
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gations made were misrepresentation concerning Telekom’s real estate values and the failure 
to disclose the intended acquisition of the American telephone company Voice Stream Wire-
less Corp..38 This led to a wave of shareholder actions against Deutsche Telekom in both 
Germany and the United States.39 Over 17,000 shareholder claims were subsequently brought 
to court in Germany alone, represented by around 900 different law firms.40  
All of them were filed with the regional court of Frankfurt (Landgericht Frankfurt am 
Main).41 This mass of cases was equal to the courts workload of 10 years.42 To get a measure 
of the extent of the case, let it be said that there were very literally truckloads of documents 
brought to the court building,43 one judge died during the proceeding and one was routinely 
transferred44 and a complaint was filed with the constitutional court of Germany (Bundesver-
fassungsgericht) for undue delay in the proceeding45. 
Recognizing that having so many cases to deal with at the same time was too much for any 
one court to handle, on February 25th 2003 the German Government released a “Ten-Point” 
action program to promote investor protection.46 This was the initial step towards the intro-
duction of the first KapMuG47 in November of 2005.48 The original version of the act had an 
expiration date on November 1st 2010, giving it five years to prove its practicality.49 Today, a 
new act is in effect, which is due to expire on November 1st 2020.50 
 
II. Proceeding 
Getting a hold of the Telekom case certainly was the driving factor in the introduction of 
KapMuG. However the intended goal was to strengthen shareholders rights in a more general 
way, by promoting shareholder litigation. “Reestablishing the regulatory control function” of 
liability statutes by introducing a collective redress scheme was the declared intention in the 
                                                
38 Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (334-335). 
39 For a comprehensive overview over the events and timeline of the case both in Germany and the United 
States, see Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (332-360). 
40 Halberstam, 021 SUNY B.L.S.R.P., 25 (2015). 
41 Today, § 32b ZPO provides that the exclusive venue for shareholder litigation is to be the competent court at 
the registered office of the issuer. This provision is criticized by some in legal literature to be impractical and 
problematic. See Stackmann, NJW 2010, 3185 (3188), who suggests as an alternative the distribution to special-
ized courts. 
42 PM LG Frankfurt am Main, 1. 
43 Jahn, ZIP 2008, 1314 (1314). 
44 Jahn, ZIP 2008, 1314 (1315); Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (333). 
45 BVerfG NJW 2004, 3320. 
46 Seibert, BB 2003, 693 (693-698). 
47 Gesetz über Musterverfahren in kapitalmarktrechtlichen Streitigkeiten (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz 
- KapMuG), as of August 16 2005, BGBl. 2005, I p. 2437. 
48 Hess/Michailidou, WM 2003, 2318 (2318). 
49 BT Drucks. 15/5091, 47. 
50 See § 28 KapMuG . 
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governments justification of the KapMuG.51 In other words this meant more corporate control 
through private enforcement.  
Still it was made clear that there was no intention of creating a US style class action. Rather a 
“model case” collective redress scheme was to be created.52 The regional court in Frankfurt 
had already started off its immense task by trying to focus on ten “pilot-procedures” that cov-
ered most of the legal questions common to all cases - this way creating its own “model pro-
cedure”, albeit without statutory basis.53 
By choosing a model case solution the legislator deviated from the proposal of the “Commis-
sion German Corporate Governance Codex” (Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate 
Governance Kodex), which favored the solution of having a mutual representative for all (opt-
in) shareholder plaintiffs.54 The main criticism was that the shareholders who did not choose 
to opt-in could simultaneously litigate individually, which in turn could lead to different court 
decisions in the same matter and did not help in lowering the overall judiciary workload.55 
The concept of a model case procedure is not totally unknown to German Law. The KapMuG 
had its role model in German administrative law. Pursuant to Sec. 93a, para. 1 of the Rules of 
the Administrative Courts (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung - VwGO)56 a model case procedure is 
possible for certain administrative actions brought to court by individual petitioners.57 
The KapMuG procedure itself is divided into three basic stages, viz. application proceeding 
(Antragsverfahren), intermediate proceeding (Zwischenverfahren) and continuation of the 
individual proceeding (Fortsetzung des Individualverfahrens).58 
 
1. Application Proceeding 
The first step towards a KapMuG procedure is the application proceeding. The competent 
court for all shareholder claims on grounds of alleged misrepresentation is the regional court 
(Landgericht) at the place of the corporation’s registered office (§ 71 para. 2 No. 3 GVG59, § 
32b ZPO). In the individual proceeding in front of this trial court, a motion has to be filed, 
requesting a model case procedure. The motion can be filed by either the plaintiff or the de-
fendant (§ 2 para. 1 sent. 2 KapMuG). In practice it is usually the plaintiff who seeks to initi-
                                                
51 BT Drucks. 15/5091, 1, 16. 
52 Seibert, BB 2003, 693 (694-695). 
53 Duve/Pfitzner, BB 2005, 673 (676). 
54 BT-Drucks. 14/7515, 88-90. 
55 BT Drucks. 15/5091, 50. 
56 Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung - VwGO, as of December 12 2015, BGBl. 1991 I p. 686. 
57 Hess, ZIP 2005, 1713 (1715). 
58 Halfmeier/Rott/Feess, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im Kapitalmarktrecht, 19. 
59 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz - GVG, as of December 21 2015, BGBl. 1975 I p. 1077. 
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ate a KapMuG procedure.60 This seems odd, considering that usually the defendant too would 
benefit from such a procedure by getting rid of a multitude of cases simultaneously.61 A pos-
sible explanation would be that corporations hope for tactical advantages by splitting the case 
and having multiple trials.62 The motion may only be filed in first instance (§ 2 para. 1 sent. 1 
KapMuG), so if a case has already gone on appeal, it can no longer be part of a KapMuG pro-
cedure. After the trial court verifies the motion’s admissibility, it is made public on the elec-
tronic litigation register (elektronisches Klageregister) pursuant to § 3 para. 2 KapMuG. The 
publication is supposed to encourage other shareholders to file a similar motion in trial 
court.63 This is very important because only if ten such commutated motions are filed within 
six months of the first motion, does the KapMuG procedure enter its main stage, the interme-
diate proceeding (§ 6 para. 1 sent. 1 KapMuG). 
 
2. Intermediate Proceeding 
If the quorum is met within the given time limit, the trial court issues an order for reference to 
the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) pursuant to § 6 KapMuG. In its order, the 
court sets the original list of legal questions to be decided in the intermediate proceeding. 
Subject of the proceeding can be the legal clarification of questions that are fundamental to all 
individual cases (§ 2 para. 1 sent. 1 KapMuG). That means not the validity of the claims 
themselves is decided by the Higher Regional Court, but the underlying issues which are the 
same for all cases. The Higher Court may for examples decide on the question of whether a 
Sales Prospectus or an ad hoc announcement issued by the corporation was incorrect or mis-
leading.64 “Non-collectivizable“ issues however will not be decided, e.g. the individual dam-
age65 or the limitation or forfeiture of a claim.66 During the intermediate proceeding, all indi-
vidual trials that are dependent on issues of the model procedure are suspended, regardless of 
whether the individual plaintiff opted in by filing a motion of request (§ 8 para. 1 KapMuG). 
That means as soon as the KapMuG procedure has reached the point of the intermediate pro-
ceeding, no other individual trial regarding the same case can be held anywhere in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. This has been described as the “suction” effect of the KapMuG.67 
                                                
60 Stackmann, NJW 2010, 3185 (3186). 
61 Stackmann, NJW 2010, 3185 (3186). 
62 BT Drucks. 14/7515, 89. 
63 Hess, ZIP 2005, 1713 (1715). 
64 BT Drucks. 15/5091, 20. 
65 LG München I, BeckRS 2006, 18838. 
66 BGH, WM 2008, 1353 (1353). 
67 This is the official term used in the Government’s Justification of the KapMuG, BT Drucks. 15/5091, 25; see 
also Bergmeister, KapMuG, 226. 
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Parties of the intermediate proceeding are the defendant and a “model plaintiff” (Musterklä-
ger) as well as the “joined parties” (Beigeladene) consisting of all other individual plaintiffs 
who have “opted-in” (§ 9 para. 1 KapMuG). The model plaintiff is selected by the court. Be-
fore making the decision the court has to give consideration to the suitability of the plaintiff in 
question, the amount of this plaintiff’s claim and the will of the majority of the plaintiffs (§ 9 
para. 2 KapMuG). 
Now all injured shareholders who have not yet gone to court have two options. Either they 
take their claim to court, in which case their individual trial will immediately be suspended 
and the plaintiff will join the KapMuG procedure as a “joined party”, due to the suction effect 
described above. This joining can happen at any point of the intermediate proceeding so long 
as no final verdict has been reached (§ 8 para. 1 KapMuG). The other option is to register the 
claim with the Higher Regional Court within six months of the initiation of the intermediate 
procedure. In this case the court’s decision in the KapMuG procedure will not be legally bind-
ing for the shareholder but the limitation of the claim will still be suspended (§ 204 para. 1 
No. 6a of the German Civil Code - Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)68). The differentiation 
between these two options is very important, as it has far-reaching effects and sets unwanted 
incentives, as will be discussed in further detail below.69  
The actual procedure follows the general rules of the ZPO if not otherwise provided for in the 
KapMuG (§ 11 para. 1 KapMuG). At the end of the intermediate proceeding, the Higher Re-
gional Court will issue a legally binding decision on the questions of fact and law that were 
raised (§ 16 para 1 KapMuG). 
 
3. Continuation of the Individual Proceeding 
The Higher Regional Courts decision can be brought on appeal to the Federal Court of Justice 
in Germany (Bundesgerichtshof - BGH) by any party of the intermediate proceeding pursuant 
to §§ 20 and 21 KapMuG. After a final verdict has been reached, the (suspended) individual 
proceedings are continued at trial court level (§ 22 para. 4 KapMuG). The decisions of the 
intermediate procedure are legally binding and the trial court will only have to decide on the 
(legal and factual) questions that are individual for each case, e.g. extent and causation of in-
dividual damages.70 
 
                                                
68 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB, as of November 20 2015, BGBl. 2002 I p. 42, 2909; 2003 I p. 738. 
69 D. II. 1.. 
70 Halfmeier/Rott/Feess, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im Kapitalmarktrecht, 34. 
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III. Analysis 
The question remains whether the introduction of the KapMuG can be thought of as a success. 
This section will try to give an answer to this by analyzing the actual impact the introduction 
of the KapMuG has had in terms of number of cases filed. 
There were four declared goals that the legislative hoped to achieve.71 The first and foremost 
aim was to create greater incentive for shareholders to sue, i.e. to promote private enforce-
ment.72 This goes hand in hand with the second declared goal, which was to make effective 
enforcement easier for private individuals.73 The third aim was to lower the workload of the 
courts dealing with securities fraud actions.74 Last but not least there was the growing fear 
that the Federal Republic of Germany would lose its attractiveness as “justice site” (Jus-
tizstandort), considering that it was possible for shareholders to litigate claims in a foreign 
country by way of “forum shopping”. This could effectively lead to a loss of Germany’s judi-
cial control over domestic securities markets, thus the fourth goal was to increase the attrac-
tiveness of Germany as justice site.75 
 
1. Shareholder Activity before and after KapMuG76 
Starting off with the extent of shareholder action, the main question is how many such cases 
are actually brought to court each year. The focus here is on suits concerning misrepresenta-
tion on secondary market. In legal literature there has been talk about a “flood” of shareholder 
securities fraud actions ever since the stock market crash of 2001/2002.77 However neither 
source nor actual numbers were provided. To be fair, before the dot-com collapse, there was 
hardly any shareholder action against stock corporations.78 However from 2001 to 2013, there 
were only exactly 111 court decisions concerning misrepresentation suits brought forward by 
shareholders in all of Germany. That amounts to an average of 8-9 court decisions per year - 
talking of a “flood” here seems (mildly speaking) not exactly on point.  
Now how has this number been influenced by the introduction of the KapMuG in 2005? From 
2001 to 2004 there were 24 cases, resulting in an average of 6 cases per year. From 2005 to 
                                                
71 All four topics had already been subject of a discussion in legal literature and were named as reasons for the 
importance of introducing a collective redress scheme, see Reuschle, WM 2004, 966 (972). 
72 BT Drucks. 15/5091, 16. 
73 BT Drucks. 15/5091, 16. 
74 BT Drucks. 15/5091, 17. 
75 BT Drucks. 15/5091, 17. 
76 The litigation data for this section comes from the comprehensive list of published and unpublished court 
decisions on the matter of misrepresentation on secondary market in Germany in: KK WpHG / Möllers/Leisch, 
Vor §§ 37b, c “Rechtsprechung”; see also: Hdb. Kapitalanlagerecht / Fleischer, § 6 RN 1 footnote 1. 
77 Erttmann/Keul, WM 2007, 482 (482). 
78 To be exact, there were six relevant court decisions in the time from 1982 to 2000.  
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2013 there were 87 cases, leading to an average of almost 10 cases per year. Seeing this in-
crease of around 67% may seem impressive at first. Nevertheless the total number pales in 
international comparison, as the following section will show. 
 
2. Effective Enforcement through KapMuG Procedures 
Turning towards the second declared goal, effective enforcement through collective redress, 
the numbers grow even smaller. From 2005 until today there have been only 14 decisions in 
different model cases.79 Even when excluding the starting phase80 until the first KapMuG pro-
cedure was decided in 200781, this only amounts to an average of 1.5 cases per year. By com-
parison, 1,607 class actions were decided in the same period of time in the US - amounting to 
a total average of 178 court decisions per year.82 Now of course these numbers have to be 
seen in the light of each country’s total stock market capitalization. As of 2014, stock market 
capitalization in the US was 26,330,589,190,000 USD while in Germany it was only 
1,738,539,060,000 USD.83 This leads to a ratio of 15.14 to 1. Yet even integrating this infor-
mation there are eight class actions for every one KapMuG procedure.84  
Considering this, measured on international standards, the KapMuG does not provide a col-
lective redress scheme that is as widely accepted and used as the US securities class action. 
The comparison seems especially important when thinking about another declared goal of the 
KapMuG, increasing the attractiveness of Germany as justice site. 
 
3. International Competition 
As mentioned before, there was the general fear that Germany would gradually lose judicial 
control over the domestic securities market.85 The most conclusive way to measure this effect 
is to look at how many US class actions were filed against German companies, i.e. corpora-
tions which have their headquarters in Germany.86 An extensive search within the Securities 
Class Actions Clearinghouse Filings Database reveals that there has been a total of 15 class 
actions against Germany based corporations, the first one filed in 2000. During the period 
from 2007 until today there were eight such cases. For the period from 2000 to 2006 that 
makes an average of 1 case per year; for the period of 2007 to date, the average is 0.89 cases 
                                                
79 This data is publicly available at the electronic litigation register at: https://www.bundesanzeiger.de/ . 
80 As is suggested by Erttmann/Keul, WM 2007, 482 (482). 
81 This was the DaimlerChrysler case, OLG Stuttgart, WM 2007, 595. 
82 Stanford, Federal Securities Class Action Litigation 1996 - YTD. 
83 World Bank, Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (current US$). 
84 15.14 (factor) * 14 (KapMuG procedures) = 211.96  ||  1607 (Class actions) / 211.96 = 7.59 ≈ 8. 
85 BT Drucks. 15/5091, 17; see also Hess/Michailidou, WM 2003, 2318 (2325). 
86 This procedure was suggested by Halfmeier/Rott/Feess, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im Kapitalmarktrecht, 82. 
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per year. This drop of 11% cannot be considered significant and it seems highly questionable 
if it can be attributed to the introduction of the KapMuG at all. 
On a side note, the German legislator’s fear of extensive forum shopping by investors on the 
domestic stock market has been incidentally eased by the US Supreme Court, which in Mor-
risson v. National Australia Bank held that the anti-fraud provision of the SEC Rules87 does 
not apply extraterritorially.88 That means German investors will no longer be able to sue cor-
porations in the United States using US securities class action in regard to stock they pur-
chased on a German (or other Non-US) stock exchange.89 This ultimately affirms Germany’s 
judicial control over domestic stock markets.90 
 
4. Judicial Workload 
Last of all the question remains whether the introduction of the KapMuG did in any way help 
in lowering the judicial workload. 
In regard to the Telekom procedure, the final verdict by the Federal Court of Justice of Ger-
many has only been spoken very recently, on October 21st 2014 and published in 2015.91 Now 
that the model case has been finally decided, the individual proceedings will be continued in 
front of the trial court.92 Up until today, no final court decision has been made public for any 
of the trial procedures.93 That means over 15 years have passed since the first claims against 
Telekom have been filed with the Regional Court of Frankfurt. By comparison, the same case 
was brought to court in the US as a class action and settled in 2005 after only five years.94 The 
fact that even after the introduction of the KapMuG the model procedure took almost ten 
years in total - twice as long as it took the case in the US to be settled - suggests that the judi-
cial workload in Germany has at least not been lowered to the US’ level in regard to collec-
tive redress procedures. But has it been lowered at all? The hope was that by factoring out the 
elements common to all individual cases and centrally deciding on them only once (i.e. in the 
model case procedure), the overall judiciary workload would be lowered.95 
                                                
87 SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (Sec. 10; 48 Stat. 891; 15 U.S.C. 78j) [13 FR 8183, Dec. 22, 1948, as 
amended at 16 FR 7928, Aug. 11, 1951]. 
88 Morrisson v. National Australia Bank, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010). 
89 Lehmann, RIW 2010, 841 (847); see for the remaining possibilities of securities litigation (against Non-US 
corporations) Mankowski, NZG 2010, 961 (965). 
90 It is however doubted how effective that judicial control is in comparison to the previous US control, see Leh-
mann, RIW 2010, 841 (847) who pleads for more private enforcement in Europe. 
91 BGH NJW 2015, 236. 
92 See supra, C. II. 3.. 
93 As of February 04 2016. 
94 Stanford, Case Summary Deutsche Telekom AG Securities Regulation. 
95 BT Drucks. 15/5091, 17. 
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However, commentators are in agreement that this goal has not been reached.96 This is at-
tributed to the fact that the KapMuG does not change anything about the necessity of individ-
ual trials.97 In addition to this, a considerable amount of effort is necessary to just determine 
the “collectivizable” material common to all cases.98 Furthermore, it is at least in theory pos-
sible for all parties to go on (individual) appeal and revision on grounds of alleged errors of 
fact or law concerning issues that could only be dealt with in the individual proceedings.99 
All in all the model case procedure provides no real remedy for the judicial overload generally 
caused by sheer number of cases.100 
 
5. Conclusion 
The introduction of the KapMuG as a means for collective redress was nearly uniformly wel-
comed by scholars.101 During the course of the KapMuG reform in 2012102, the legislator even 
mentioned the possibility of integrating a similar collective redress scheme into the ZPO, if it 
proved itself until “sunset” in 2020.103 The hope is to have a wider scope of application for 
collective redress, especially in the area of product, pharmaceutical and environmental liabil-
ity.104 
However the analysis above shows that the self-set goals have not entirely been met and there 
is room for improvement. Private enforcement in Germany has increased in recent years but 
there is still a lot of room for more, especially when looking at collective redress and in com-
parison with the United States. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, the matter of 
extensive forum shopping by German investors does not seem as pressing as before. Still, the 
courts’ problem with handling a large number of similar cases at the same time has not effec-
tively been eliminated by the KapMuG as there still has to be an individual trial for each 
claimant. 
Notwithstanding this, some of the weaknesses of the KapMuG (especially the last one men-
tioned) might be attributed to more fundamental and opposing principles in German civil pro-
cedure, as the following section will try to show. 
                                                
96 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 315-317; Hdb. Kapitalmarktinformation / Schmitz, § 33 RN 403; Hdb. Managerhaf-
tung / Hess, § 14 RN 15; Plaßmeier, NZG 2005, 609 (614). 
97 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 316. 
98 Hdb. Kapitalmarktinformation / Schmitz, § 33 RN 403, for a detailed description of all the factors that cause 
delays during the proceeding, see Erttmann/Keul, WM 2007, 482 (485). 
99 Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (349). 
100 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 317. 
101 See Hdb. Kapitalmarktinformation / Schmitz, § 33 RN 397 with further proof. 
102 To be exact it was not a reform but by definition a new Act in itself, see supra, C. I.. 
103 BT Drucks. 17/8799, 14. 
104 Keul/Erttmann, WM 2007, 482 (482). 
13 
 
D. Areas of Conflict 
It has already been pointed out that German Civil Procedure is based on the concept of a two-
party system with little room for a scheme of collective redress. As such, the KapMuG marks 
a break with fundamental principles of German law.105 
The problem has to be seen in the broader perspective of the conflicting policy objectives un-
derlying the concept of private enforcement. Private Enforcement as part of a corporate gov-
ernance system is driven by two policy objectives. These are (1.) to incentivize private action 
and (2.) to efficiently handle these actions.106 
 
I. Incentivizing Shareholder Action 
As has already been explained, the main barrier for shareholder action is rational apathy be-
cause of dispersed damages. The German answer to this problem has typically been the “loser 
pays rule”, which ultimately relieves the plaintiff of court and attorney fees in case his claim 
is meritorious and the trial successful.107 Is this fee shifting enough though? Looking at the 
numbers above, the answer seems to be no. Fee shifting is only possible up to the amount of 
the (statutory) fixed fees and most of the times there will be significantly higher contractual 
fee agreements (e.g. hourly rates) between the plaintiff and his lawyer.108 There is also still 
the plaintiff’s risk of losing and then himself having to pay double.109 So how then can the 
large number of plaintiffs in the Telekom litigation be explained? The Telekom case was an 
exception because there was no rational apathy involved.110 Even though no institutional in-
vestors were part of the trial, the average individual claim was about 5,900 EUR - an amount 
high enough to overcome the barriers of rational apathy.111 This was due to the fact that be-
fore its IPO, Telekom launched a huge public promotional campaign for its share, which led a 
lot of private investors to invest in Telekom shares as part of their pension scheme - many of 
them purchasing stocks for the first time in their lives.112 
In addition to that there was a decision by the Federal High Court of Germany113, holding that 
an action for damages in regard to prospectus liability in general and the Telekom case in par-
                                                
105 KK KapMuG / Hess, Einl. RN 4. 
106 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 42. 
107 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 24-25. 
108 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 25. 
109 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 36. 
110 Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (72). 
111 Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (332-333); Hess, JZ 2011, 66 (72). 
112 Jahn, ZIP 2008, 1314 (1314). 
113 BGH NJW 2003, 2384. 
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ticular was covered by standard legal protection insurance.114 This aspect (as a further incen-
tive to sue) however is reduced today, because most insurance companies have promptly re-
acted to the court decision by adapting modified terms and conditions.115 
Further incentives for shareholder action could in theory be achieved through US-style con-
tingency fees.116 A Contingency fee is a success-based remuneration of the attorney combined 
with his proportional participation in the monetary damages awarded by the court.117 This 
would entail the risk of abuse through the attorney.118 For fear of a “complaint industry” 
Germany has traditionally been very conservative with contingent fees.119 
 
II. Efficient Litigation 
Efficiency is the second key element for private enforcement.120 Here lies the second obstacle 
posed by German legislation: the constitutionally guaranteed importance of the individual 
protection rights (Individualrechtsschutz). Concerning collective redress, there are two main 
areas of conflict, namely (1.) pooling of claims vs. individual assertion and (2.) slender proce-
dure vs. participation rights. 
 
1. Pooling of Claims vs. Individual Assertion  
One of the more fundamental German constitutional rights is the right to judicial access (Jus-
tizgewährleistungsanspruch), which encompasses the right to an effective legal protection in 
civil law disputes, including access to court, a generally comprehensive assessment of facts 
and law relevant to the case through the judge and a binding verdict.121 The original version 
of the KapMuG (2005) did not include the possibility to “register” a claim and thereby sus-
pend its limitation.122 This led to a factual compulsion to join the model procedure, because of 
the suction effect described above and the relatively short period of limitation on the 
claims.123 It was heavily debated whether this was a constitutional breach of the right to judi-
                                                
114 Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (344); Bergmeister, KapMuG, 8-9. 
115 Halfmeier/Rott/Feess, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im Kapitalmarktrecht, 39; Bergmeister, KapMuG, 306; see 
for example § 3 (2) a) HUK-Coburg ARB 2015, or section  9.3.6.2., D.A.S. Rechtsschutz. 
116 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 333. 
117 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 32, 162-170. 
118 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 33. 
119 Warren III, 37:3 Brook Int’l L. 1075, 1085 (2011-2012). 
120 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 41. 
121 BVerfGE 80, 103 (107); 85 337 (345); 97, 169 (185). 
122 See supra, C. II. 2. 
123 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 228; In the Telekom procedure this was avoided by registering the claims with the 
ÖRA, a kind of public mediation services institution, which had a suspension effect on the limitation pursuant to 
§ 204 para. 1 No. 4 BGB, see Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (344). 
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cial access.124 The legislator responded to this by introducing the option to register a claim - 
thus suspending this claim’s limitation while not being affected by the binding effect of the 
court’s decision in the model proceeding.125 By consequently weakening the “pooling” of 
claims, the German legislator responded to constitutional concerns to the detriment of effi-
ciency in shareholder litigation. 
The simplest solution to create an effective pooling of claims would probably be to just create 
a US-style “opt-out” model. Considering the constitutional concerns just mentioned however, 
this seems utterly out of question in Germany.126 
 
2. Slender Procedure vs. Participation Rights 
Other principles in German law are the constitutional right to a fair hearing (rechtliches 
Gehör) and the principle of party control (Dispositionsmaxime).127 These rights establish that 
the parties can determine themselves what is to be decided by the judge, i.e. they can dispose 
over the matter in question,128 and that they have to be heard by the judge.129 In consequence, 
all joined parties (basically130) have the same rights (e.g. to plea or present evidence) as the 
model plaintiff, pursuant to § 14 KapMuG. This goes fundamentally to the detriment of a 
slender and ultimately efficient proceeding. How could the Telekom case then be decided at 
all, albeit after almost 10 years? The simple answer is that almost none of the joined parties 
had made use of their participation rights.131 Out of the 900 law firms involved on the plain-
tiffs’ side, only 24 initially showed up personally in court and later only a handful re-
mained.132 If every one of the 900 law firms submitted just one pleading (not even one for 
every one of the 17,000 claimants) and only Telekom replied to each of them, the proceeding 
would have still dragged on until today.133 
                                                
124 For the voices alleging a constitutional breach, see e.g. Scholz, ZG 2003, 248 (260); Meyer, WM 2003, 1349 
(1352-1353). For the other side, see e.g. Hess, ZIP 2005, 1713 (1715); Reuschle, WM 2004, 966 (977). 
125 Wardenbach, GWR 2013, 35 (36). For the resulting further problems and possible solutions (concerning 
D&O insurance), see von Bernuth/Kremer, NZG 2012, 890 (892); Wardenbach, GWR 2013, 35 (37); Wigand, 
WM 2013, 1884 (1887). 
126 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 45. 
127 See for the constitutional roots Rau, KapMuG und Dispositionsgrundsatz, 32, 165. 
128 As the judge of the trial court generates the brief of questions presented to the higher court, this right is 
somewhat constrained, see Haar, Investor protection through model case procedures (CFS Working Paper No. 
2013/21), 22. 
129 Halberstam, 021 SUNY B.L.S.R.P.,30 (2015); Rau, KapMuG und Dispositionsgrundsatz, 167-168. 
130 As long as their pleading does not contradict that of the model plaintiff, § 14 sent. 2 KapMuG. 
131 Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (359-360). 
132 Jahn, ZIP 2008, 1314 (1316). 
133 Tilp, FS Krämer, 331 (360, FN 105). 
16 
 
Ultimately there is an unsolvable conflict between fundamental constitutional and procedural 
principles in German law on one side and the goal of a having a slender procedure resulting in 
efficient litigation.134 
 
E. Conclusion 
In short summary, there is a general trend in Europe and Germany in particular towards more 
private enforcement, designated as a second track parallel to public enforcement of securities 
laws. Because of dispersed damages and rational apathy, a collective redress scheme is a pre-
requisite for effective private enforcement. In the form of the KapMuG, the German legislator 
has tried to create one such with mixed success. Even though the amount of shareholder ac-
tions have somewhat increased, the current legal framework does not provide the judiciary 
with means to deal with them in a timely fashion. The main deficiencies of the KapMuG 
however are rooted in constitutionally guaranteed procedural rights. These rights and princi-
ples are not easily abandoned. 
The current spirit in Germany is definitely in favor of shareholder litigation. Private law en-
forcement is increasingly seen as positive and US-style class actions are more and more quot-
ed as positive rather than negative examples.135 Even creating a definite opt-out model is 
openly favored by some.136 History has shown that Germany has always been slow to adapt in 
securities supervision and enforcement.137 It might be that in the field of private enforcement 
too, Germany just needs more time to adapt and maybe just another push. After over 15 years 
of judicial work with the Telekom case, the current VW emissions scandal might just be that 
push, as it could become the next severe test for German collective redress in securities litiga-
tion. In four years the sun will set on the current version of the KapMuG and at the moment it 
seems more than questionable whether it will be deemed ripe for integration into the ZPO. 
  
                                                
134 Halberstam, 021 SUNY B.L.S.R.P., 30-31 (2015). 
135 KK KapMuG / Hess, Einl., RN 2. 
136 Jahn, ZIP 2008, 1314 (1317). 
137 For example, the BAWe (now: BaFin) was only created in 1994, long after the US (1933), Belgium (1935) 
and France (1967) had created corresponding institutions, see Hopt, WM 2009, 1873 (1879). 
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Part II – United States of America 
 
A. Chapter introduction 
This paper will give an overview of the securities class action (B), go on to show the process 
of securities class action (C), and introduce the discussions about the strengths and weakness-
es of some of the rationales of the current private enforcement system (D). A brief conclusion 
will follow (E).  
 
B. Rule 10b-5 Class Actions in the U.S.: An Overview 
In the U.S., average of 189 securities class action claims were filed from 1997 to 2013, and 
170 class actions were filed in 2014, according to Cornerstone Research, an economic and 
financial concerting firm which tracks securities class action filings.138 Less than 200 cases 
each year may not look significant compared to the total civil cases filed each year. But con-
fined to federal class actions, securities class actions take up nearly 50% of cases pending in 
the Federal Court of the U.S..139 And 170 class actions in 2014 means that about one in 28 
corporations listed on U.S. exchanges was subject to a class action.140 During the period of 
1997 and 2007, plaintiffs’ attorneys earned nearly 17 billion dollars in fees from securities 
litigation.141 In 2014, when total settlement dollars in securities litigation was the lowest  in 
16 years, the total amount was still above 1 billion dollars.142 And among those cases, many 
actions were based on Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b-5.143  
                                                
138 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 1 
(2015), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2014/Cornerstone-Research-Securities-Class-Action-
Filings-2014-YIR.pdf. 
139 John C. Coffee, Jr, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implication, 106 
Colum. L. Rev. 1534, 1539 (2006) (finding that percentage of securities class actions pending in federal courts as 
of September 30, 2002, 2003, and 2004 to be 47.5%, 47%, and 47.9%). 
140  CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 9 
(2015), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2014/Cornerstone-Research-Securities-Class-Action-
Filings-2014-YIR.pdf. 
141 Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 69 Business Lawyer 
307, 308-09 (Feb. 2014).  
142 CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 2014 REVIEW AND 
Analysis 1 (2015), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/701f936e-ab1d-425b-8304-
8a3e063abae8/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2014-Review-and-Analysis.pdf. 
143  CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 8 
(2015), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2014/Cornerstone-Research-Securities-Class-Action-
Filings-2014-YIR.pdf (finding that the percentage of filings with Rule 10b-5 claims remained essentially un-
changed in 2014 at 85 percent for the third year in a row). 
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The private right of action based on SEC Rule 10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”) was not created by the 
legislators of the U.S..144 The Congress only rendered conduct unlawful if it was prohibited 
by an SEC rule in Section 10(b) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 (“Section 10(b)”).145 
The SEC promulgated  Rule 10b-5 which is the catch-all antifraud provision proscribing 
fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.146 
But Rule 10b-5 also did not explicitly adopt a private right of action, either. Instead, the judi-
ciary, when deciding on defendant’s motion to dismiss on lack of jurisdiction grounds, ruled 
that there is an implied right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.147 Since then Rule 
10b-5 actions has eventually become a dominant cause of action by use of class action proce-
dure as shown below. 
 
Percentage of complaints of securities class actions cases filed each year which includes 
Rule 10b-5 actions148 
Year Percentage 
2011 71 
2012 85 
2013 84 
2014 85 
 
Settlements by nature of claims 1996-2014149 
Nature of Claim Number of cases 
Section 11 or Section 12 only 83 
Both Rule 10b-5 and Section 11 and/or 12(a)(2) 253 
Rule 10b-5 only 1,102 
All cases since 1996 1,438 
                                                
144 Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 69 Business Lawyer 
307, 324 (Feb. 2014) (“Because the private right of action under section 10(b) is implied, it is entirely a creature 
of the judicial imagination.”). 
145 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH, RULE 10B-5 SECURITIES-FRAUD LITIGA-
TION 18 (2015). 
146 Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities 
Settlements, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 755, 764-65 (2009). 
147 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
148  CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 8 
(2015), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2014/Cornerstone-Research-Securities-Class-Action-
Filings-2014-YIR.pdf. 
149 CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 2014 REVIEW AND 
ANALYSIS 13 (2015), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/701f936e-ab1d-425b-8304-
8a3e063abae8/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2014-Review-and-Analysis.pdf 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic v. Levinson is recognized to have allowed the investor 
lawsuits alleging open market fraud for Rule 10b-5 cause of action to be widely used in secu-
rities fraud litigation by not rejecting the presumption of reliance, that is the presumption 
which most courts of appeals have adopted by the time of the decision.150 The traditional, and 
most direct, way a plaintiff may show reliance is by showing that the plaintiff knew about the 
company’s statement and bought or sold stock based on that misrepresentation.151 In Basic, 
however, the Supreme Court recognized that requiring investors to show direct reliance would 
place an unnecessarily unrealistic burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an 
impersonal market.152 The Supreme Court observed that requiring individualized reliance 
would prevent investors from proceeding with a class action in Rule 10b-5 suits because if 
every investor had to prove direct reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentation then  individ-
ual issues would overwhelm the common ones making class certification inappropriate.153 
And the Supreme Court held that it is not inappropriate to apply a rebuttable presumption of 
reliance supported by the fraud on the market theory.154 
 
C. Rule 10b-5 Class Action Process 
When there is an announcement of correction of a prior representation which follows with a 
drastic stock price change, plaintiffs with counsels will typically sue multiple defendants in-
cluding but not limited to the issuer, CEO and CFO in a class action alleging Rule 10b-5 
claim. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), the plaintiff who files 
a securities class action complaint must publish notice to other potential class members to 
encourage them to step forward within 20 days.155 Within 60 days after the date of the publi-
cation, any member of the purported class may move to serve as lead plaintiffs.156 The court 
must appoint a lead plaintiff not later than 90 days after the publication of notice.157  
When choosing the lead plaintiff, the court should appoint as lead plaintiff the member or 
members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be the most capable of 
                                                
150 Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 151, 153 (2009) 
(“In that sense, the Supreme Court simply endorsed what was by then a solid line of precedent.”). 
151 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH, RULE 10B-5 SECURITIES-FRAUD LITIGA-
TION 67 (2015). 
152 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988). 
153 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988). 
154 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988). 
155 15 U.S.C.A. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(A). 
156 15 U.S.C.A. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(II). 
157 15 U.S.C.A. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). 
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adequately representing the interest of class members.158 It is the chosen lead plaintiff who 
select and retain counsel to represent the class subject to the approval of the court.159 Alt-
hough the PSLRA imposes only the duty to select and retain counsel to the lead plaintiff, the 
courts have generally recognized the power of the lead plaintiff to control the overall litiga-
tion including discovery, the assertion of legal theories and settlement negotiations.160 Once 
the lead plaintiff is appointed, the courts generally allow plaintiffs to file an amended, consol-
idated class action complaint.161  
The Summons and complaint must be served on the defendant within 90 days after the filing 
of the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedures (“FRCP”) rule 4.162 When the de-
fendants are served, they may opt for moving to dismiss the cases.163 PSLRA stays discovery 
pending any motion to dismiss.164  
After the motion to dismiss, the next pivotal moment where the parties collide is the class 
certification stage.165 FRCP rule 23(a) allows one or members of a class to sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all mem-
bers is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims 
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.166 
These requirements for a federal class action apply to Rule 10b-5 class actions seeking mone-
tary relief.167 However, to seek monetary relief the plaintiff also has to meet the requirement 
of FRCP rule 23(b)(3). That is, the plaintiffs have to show that (1) questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that (2) a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.168 The party who moves for class certification bears the burden 
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to show that each of the FRCP rule 23 prerequisites are satisfied.169 Of these requirements, the 
predominance requirement allows the courts to exercise considerable discretion when deter-
mining what causes of action are suitable on their facts for class-wide determination.170  
In a Rule 10b-5 cause of actions context, elements of FRCP rule 23(a) and superiority re-
quirement of FRCP rule 23(b)(3) are not much of an issue.171 However, much controversy 
centered around the predominance requirement.  
The Supreme Court has recognized that for  cause of action under Rule 10b-5 the plaintiff 
must allege and prove 6 elements, that is (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission), (2) 
scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind, (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a securi-
ty, (4) reliance, (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.172 And there are two pivotal stages, 
that is class certification stage and the trial stage, where the elements could potentially be 
proven. So there are potentially 12 number of cases where each element could be proven.  
Of the 6 elements, the Supreme Court decided that reliance requirement is need to be inquired 
at the class certification stage in Basic.173 But the debate over the adequacy of the Supreme 
Court decision went on until the Supreme Court once again upheld the decision in 2014.174 In 
2011, the Supreme Court decided that loss causation need not be proven at class certification 
stage.175 And the Supreme Court ruled that materiality requirement need not be proven at 
class certification stage in 2013.176 The decision on class certification may be appealed sub-
ject to the discretion of the court.177  
Not many securities class action cases actually go to trial. Only 21 have gone to trial and only 
15 have reached a verdict or judgment out of 4,435 securities class actions that were filed be-
tween the enactment of PSLRA and December 31th, 2014.178 Another study found that out of 
securities claim cases seeking damages from 1980 to 2005, only 37 cases that were tried to 
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judgment against public companies, their officers and directors, or both.179 Most cases that are 
not dismissed are settled. The cases may settle any time during the procedure. About 40% of 
the securities class actions including Rule 10b-5 class action are settled while there is still a 
possibility of dismissal.180 Because settlements made as a class binds other class members 
who are absent, FRCP 23(e) requires court approval as a safeguard against abuse.181  
Settlement procedure consists of three phases: (1) the preliminary approval hearing; (2) the 
notice period; and (3) the final approval and fairness hearing.182 When the parties have agreed 
to the terms of the settlement, they must move the court for preliminary approval.183 The court 
reviews whether (1) the proposed class is suitable for final certification under the Federal 
Rules; and (2) the substantive and procedural terms of the settlement are fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.184 When the court gives a preliminary approval, the parties should then notify pro-
posed class members of the settlement.185 After the notice is served, the court will conduct a 
final approval hearing and determine whether to finally approve the settlement.186  
It is possible to opt out of a class action in class actions seeking money damages.187 If a party 
opts out of a securities class action, the party is not bound by the class action.188 Study shows 
that in cases where there were parties who opted out to sue individually, the opted out parties 
have done better than the they would have if they have not opted out and settled as a class.189 
Opting out is possible even at the class action settlement stage by the court’s discretion.190  
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In Rule 10b-5 action, the plaintiff commonly name both the company and the potentially re-
sponsible executives and directors as defendants.191 However, the Supreme Court of United 
States have been criticized as narrowing the scope of defendants over the years.192 In Central 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., the Supreme Court concluded 
that there is no private aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b), which means that 
there is no cause of action for aider and abettors in a Rule 10b(5) action.193 And in Stoneridge 
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Supreme Court when addressing 
whether two third-party participants in a fraudulent scheme, engineered by a corporate issuer, 
faced liability in a private securities lawsuit for harm caused by the issuer's false and mislead-
ing corporate disclosures, decided that there is no reliance, and hence no liability, when the 
link between the third party's actions and the resulting misrepresentation by the issuer is too 
remote or attenuated.194 Then again, In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 
the Supreme Court held that a mutual fund investment advisor can not be held liable for Rule 
10b-5 private action for misrepresentation in the prospectuses of the mutual fund because it 
did not make a misrepresentation within the meaning of Rule 10b-5.195 
  
D. Analysis 
Rule 10b-5 class action may serve multiple purposes. It may (1) serve to compensate fraud 
victims, (2) operate as a deterrent against future fraud, or/and (3) work as a corporate govern-
ance mechanism. But there are different views on whether the class action is working effec-
tively to serve these purposes which we will look into below.  
 
I. Compensation Rationale 
Rule 10b-5 class action is criticized for not being an adequate tool to compensate the victims 
for various reasons. First of all, it is criticized that the private litigation is performing poorly 
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to compensate the victims.196 Study shows that the median recovery rate for class actions does 
not exceed 7.2% of the estimated investor loss.197 Although it is hard to calculate the damages 
caused by the revelation of the misrepresentation which can be connected to the misrepresen-
tation itself,198 the difference between the estimated investor loss and the median recovery 
rate does seem substantial. Another study shows that approximately 96% of securities class 
action settlements fell within the insurance coverage. 199  The finding that the settlement 
amounts are almost always covered by whatever insurance coverage that a corporation may 
have at the moment could show that the settlement amount may not be an adequate compen-
sation for investor loss. 
Moreover, the fact that most of the Rule 10b-5 class actions settle in the U.S. has further im-
plications. When securities class actions settle, most of the cases are settled with the insurance 
companies paying all or most of the settlement.200 And even for the cases where insurance 
companies not paying all the settlement payments, corporations seem to pay the settlement 
payments mostly.201 This practice undermines the rationale for compensating the plaintiffs in 
Rule 10b-5 class actions for reasons below. 
Many shareholders who is a class of plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 class action may hold shares of 
the corporation named defendant.202 That is because the shareholder may have bought and 
sold the share at different times.203 Moreover, many modern investors hold stocks in portfoli-
os.204 Because these investors can be expected to sometimes benefit when the misrepresenta-
tion distorts the price by selling in a high price, while sometimes be harmed when the misrep-
resentation distorts the price by selling in a low price, thus their gain and losses will net out 
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over time as their diversified status.205 Assuming that investors are repeat players, the benefits 
and harms will mostly cancel each other out.206 This may also be true to uninformed traders 
who buy and sell stocks randomly without informational basis.207 In these instances, the liti-
gation fee including those paid to the attorneys will be extra cost suffered for a benefit which 
has been already accomplished by diversification.208 
However, this may not be the case for retail investors who buy and hold the stocks for a long 
time.209 Since in the U.S., Rule 10b-5 class action is actionable to those who have bought or 
sold the stocks, someone who holds on to the stock without trading for a long time will not 
have standing to sue.210 They will be systematically compensating for the plaintiffs in the 
class action unless they may be compensated in other ways.211 As we will see below, they will 
not be compensated because of the settlement practice. 
Another group of people who are not holding their stocks in portfolio are informed inves-
tors.212 The informed trader who instead of diversifying incur cost of research to profit from 
acting on the information by trading are more likely to suffer net losses from securities fraud 
precisely because they trade on information, including fraudulent information.213 For these 
kind of traders, compensation is both desirable and noncircular.214 
This problem mainly occurs because the defendant contributing for the damages of the plain-
tiffs are the corporation by paying the premium to the insurance company and actually paying 
the damages out of corporate assets.215 If the directors and/or officers who actually made the 
misrepresentation or the aiders and abettors of the misrepresentation such as lawyers are the 
ones who are paying for the damages to the plaintiffs, then there will be no pocket shifting to 
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the portfolio holders and no systemic loss to the long term holders.216 However, as the rule 
and practice stands in the U.S., the criticisms that Rule 10b-5 class actions is not adequately 
compensating the victims are not entirely without merits.217 
   
II. Deterrence Rationale 
It is further argued that private litigation also has a role in deterring misrepresentation.218 This 
rationales is independent from the compensation rationale in the sense that the success or fail-
ure of one does not depend upon the other.219 Corporate fraud may cause reduced manage-
ment accountability, a loss of liquidity in the stock market and distorted capital allocation.220 
Private litigation serves as a deterrence mechanism in which the plaintiff or plaintiff’s lawyer 
works as a private attorney general who punishes corporations for its prohibited behavior.221  
Deterrence works when a prospective wrongdoer decides not to do the wrongful act knowing 
that he or she will be forced to pay the full cost of any harm he or she causes.222 Number of 
offenses one would commit would be a function of probability of conviction per offense, pun-
ishment per offense and other variables.223 An increase in probability of conviction or pun-
ishment per offense would tend to reduce the number of offenses because in either case the 
probability of paying the higher price or the price itself would increase.224 In securities class 
action context, it may work as an mechanism which could increase both the probability of 
finding the misrepresentation or increasing the price to pay for making such a misrepresenta-
tion.225 However, it is criticized as not being an efficient mechanism for reasons below. 
According to a study about who detects fraud consisting of 216 cases of alleged corporate 
frauds which include all of the high-profile cases such as Enron, HealthSouth, and Worldcom, 
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there were only 3% of the cases where the detection of the fraud was attributable to private 
litigation.226 This contrasts with the finding in the study where the key role in fraud detection 
is made by employees who is the detector in 17% of the cases and the media which can be 
accountable for 13% of the cases.227 While the study may not show whether or not we need 
private litigation to detect the 3% of cases to reach the optimal level of detection, it does show 
that private litigation does not take up the bulk of the work in detecting corporate fraud.228 
Another mechanism where private litigation may have a role in detecting fraud is by enhanc-
ing transparency. That is, if private litigation adds more transparency to corporate infor-
mation, it may help deter fraud. But there are mixed findings on whether private litigation 
adds more transparency to corporate conducts or not, especially regards to voluntary disclo-
sures.229    
Private enforcement could increase the price of payment of the misrepresentation after the 
fraud was detected. But this mechanism is undermined by the usage of director and officer 
(“D&O”) insurance. When a payment is made by the corporation, it would mean that the the 
stockholders of the corporation as a residual owner is making the ultimate payment.230 And 
because the corporation usually pays the premium for the D&O insurance, the payment made 
by the D&O insurance is also born by the shareholder of the corporation as a premium paid 
by the corporation.231 
D&O insurance as commonly provided consist of 3 distinct insurance arrangement.232 They 
are (1) coverage to protect individual managers from the risk of shareholder litigation in the 
event that the corporation is unable to indemnify them, (2) coverage to reimburse the corpora-
tion for its indemnification obligations, and (3) coverage to protect the corporation from the 
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risk of shareholder litigation to which the corporate entity itself is a party.233 The part of cov-
erage which insures individual directors and officers usually include compensatory damages, 
settlement amounts, and defense costs incurred by the individual director or officer in his or 
her official capacity.234 When corporation incurs an obligation to indemnify its officers or 
directors which most policies deem to be required in every case in which a corporation is le-
gally permitted to do so, the insurer will reimburse the company pursuant to the terms of the 
indemnification obligation.235 For the cases where the liabilities arising directly against the 
corporation as a defendant in shareholder litigation, D&O insurance also included coverage to 
protect the corporation itself as a party.236 While most D&O insurance payment is made under 
coverage (2), (3) which is technically a coverage for the corporation, the insurance package as 
a whole works for the benefit of the directors and officers.237  
This doesn’t mean that the managers will always settle for their own good at the expense of 
the corporation. The managers may have incentive to settle for the benefit of the corporation. 
Considering American rule where prevailing party are not entitled to get reimbursement of the 
incurred legal fees and expense from the opposing party combined with the cost of discovery, 
the defendants will generally find settlement cheaper than litigation.238 Litigation costs for the 
defendants can be high because in a discovery process the plaintiff can control the discovery 
agenda which the defendants are obliged to respond unless they can persuade the court that 
the request is improper.239 The plaintiff’s attorney, knowing that the American rule prevents 
fee shifting will impose costs on the adversary while economizing its own cost.240  
One could argue that as long as the D&O insurers companies work to prevent and manage the 
corporation, the usage of D&O insurance works as a deterrence.241 However, study suggests 
that insurance companies do not provide loss prevention services regarding corporate fraud.242 
As long as the actual wrong doers are not actually paying for the settlement amount of the 
securities class action, enforcement by private litigation may not have the asserted deterrence 
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effect of increasing the price of misrepresentation.243 On the other hand, increasing the cost of 
making representation could potentially could cause excessive precaution cost.244 
The deterrence effect may still function indirectly if the outside professionals functioning as 
gatekeepers of corporate frauds are affected by the securities litigation.245 When a corporation 
makes a public statement, outside professionals could be efficient gatekeepers because they 
can access the corporation’s inside information when providing necessary service for making 
such a statement.246 These professionals may not have the proper incentive to perform the 
gatekeeping function because they have incentives to maintain a relationship with the corpo-
ration.247 But because the supreme court of the U.S. have have kept on removing the liability 
of the outside professionals as seen above, gatekeepers may not have sufficient incentives to 
deter corporate fraud.248  
 
III. Corporate Governance Rationale 
The justification of private litigation may not only be grounded on investor protection but also 
on enhancement of corporate governance.249 One rationale is that by making the shareholders 
pay for the corporate fraud of the managers, the securities class action creates responsibility 
and incentives to monitor the acts of the managers.250 This rationale is not without merits. 
However, considering the given power of the shareholders in U.S. corporate governance sys-
tem, shareholders may not have the power to monitor the acts of the managers.251 That is, 
shareholders may not be innocent, but they may be helpless.252  
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Another rationale for shareholder litigation is that it may enhance the quality of the disclosure 
which plays a role in corporate governance.253 Not only will better informed shareholder mon-
itor the managers better, but the allows the market mechanism like market for corporate con-
trol to work more efficiently.254 But whether securities class action as currently practiced has 
sufficient deterrence effect on managers to improve their quality of disclosure is debatable for 
the reasons seen above. Moreover, although the corporation will have to disclose information 
that are mandatory, risk of liability could increase incentives to reduce the amount of volun-
tary disclosure.255 So the over all effect of the securities class action on the disclosure system 
seems unclear. 
But shareholder litigation as a compensation mechanism may add more justification to the 
shareholder litigation as a corporate governance mechanism.256 This rationale involves the 
role of informed traders. Informed traders make costly investments to research for firm-
specific information which could include fraudulent information.257 Because informed traders 
are trading based on information, their gains and losses from securities fraud are unlikely to 
cancel each other out.258  As these informed traders promote capital market efficiency which 
will enhance corporate governance, allowing informed traders to recover their damages from 
fraudulent information could be justified.259 This compensation rationale, while persuasive as 
a justification for allowing private enforcement, could also lead to a possible demand for 
modification in U.S. securities class action.260 Because fraud on the market theory as decided 
by the U.S. Supreme court allows not only who relied on the information to recover but also 
allows those who only relied on the market price to recover as well.261  
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E. Conclusion 
Securities class action is supposed to do a lot of work in the U.S. It is expected to compensate, 
effectively deter misrepresentations, or/and work as a mechanism to enhance corporate gov-
ernance. However, private litigation as currently practiced in the U.S. are subject to much 
criticism. Whether it should be reformed to better serve its objectives or be eliminated will 
have to be considered not just by itself, but also with public enforcement mechanism which 
tries to address similar objectives by different approach.262  
Even up against much criticism, it is true that private enforcement of the U.S. is unique in the 
sense that it is not something that is left in the book, but something that is in operation.263 So 
when searching for optimal enforcement mechanism to meet the objectives of securities law, 
whether they are compensation, deterrence, or/and enhancing corporate governance, the rich 
experience of the U.S. private enforcement history should be taken into consideration. 
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Part III - Comparison 
 
A. Chapter Introduction 
As has been shown, private litigation and collective redress is an issue both in the U. S. and in 
Germany. On the basis of Part I and Part II, the following will try to draw some comparisons 
between the legal frameworks followed by considering possible obstacles of importing U.S. 
style class action to Germany. Then, we will consider some German legal framework which 
may be used in the U.S. to improve the U.S. securities class action system. Finally, we will 
consider the impact that securities law and D&O insurance practice in Germany might have 
on addressing deterrence objectives in Germany under the assumption of active enforcement, 
which will be followed by a brief conclusion.  
 
B. Comparison between US and Germany 
The comparison will focus first on a more general level (I.). Next, the incentives of the parties 
to use collective redress will be addressed (II.). Following this, the possibility of importing 
U.S. style class action to Germany and potential obstacles hereto will be discussed (III.), 
which will follow with a conclusion (IV.). 
 
I. General Observations 
Taking a broad look at Part I and Part II above, one cannot help but notice some more general 
differences between Germany and the U.S. Main differences exist in the areas of enforcement 
mechanisms, the extent of shareholder actions and the topics of legal discussion. 
 
1. Private vs. Public Enforcement 
Corporate behavior can be externally controlled by enforcing disclosure duties.264 This en-
forcement can happen in two distinct ways, i.e. by public or private means.265 
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Germany has historically been favoring public enforcement, through the BaFin, the States and 
the Public Exchanges.266 Private enforcement is only recently becoming more popular and 
being adopted on a statutory basis.267 
This marks a contrast to the situation in the U.S., where the U.S. Supreme Court has recog-
nized the supplementary role of private enforcement to public enforcement as early as 
1964.268 U.S. procedural law allows class action lawsuits for most areas of substantial law, 
including (but in no way limited to) securities fraud disputes.269  
These different approaches to the enforcement of regulations can be explicitly seen in the 
field of securities law, when contrasting the extent of private litigation in both countries. 
 
2. Extent of Private Litigation in Securities Markets 
When looking at the actual numbers of private shareholder actions for securities fraud there is 
a stark contrast between Germany and the U.S. In Germany there was a total of only 111 
court decisions concerning securities fraud action based on §§ 37b, c WpHG (the predominant 
statutory basis for misrepresentation suits) from 2001 to 2013.270 This is less than the yearly 
average of securities class action lawsuits being filed in the U.S. - a number that does not 
even come close to the total number of securities disputes.271 
These differences in factual circumstances are an explanation for the third area of contrast 
between Germany and the U.S. - the focus of legal discussion. 
 
3. Topics of Legal Discussion 
As we have seen, many securities class actions are being filed in the U.S. every year, and 
most of them are filed with Rule 10b-5 cause of action.272 But because Rule 10b-5 cause of 
action is implied not explicit, lots of issues regarding both substantive law and procedural law 
had to be cleared up by the judiciary as the Congress did not design the overall elements and 
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procedures.273  And because of the volume of filings, the U.S. Supreme Court had many 
chances to frame the structure of the implied cause of action.274 
Germany on the other hand is - provocatively speaking - still “a step behind” concerning mat-
ters of private enforcement and substantial law. A system of collective redress in the form of 
the KapMuG has only recently been established for securities market disputes.275 The Kap-
MuG and its underlying aspects of procedural law are still hotly debated and the focus is not 
as much on substantial law.276 The most relevant topic of legal discussion is how a collective 
redress scheme in Germany should look like. One possibility - importing US-style securities 
class action - will be discussed in further detail below. 
 
II. Incentives to Use Collective Redress 
One question that deserves further elaboration is: What are the incentives to use collective 
redress in both countries? For a system of collective redress in securities disputes to work and 
be actually used, it should address the incentive of the party expected to use the procedure. 
 
1. General Observations 
The mechanism of collective redress can be designed in various ways. It can be structured 
either as an opt-in system (as which the German KapMuG is basically designed) or as an opt-
out system as in the case of U.S. class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 
(FRCP) Rule 23.  
Another basic differentiation can be made concerning the scope of the court’s decision. In a 
German KapMuG procedure the court only decides on certain elements, while in the U.S. the 
court decides on the claim in its entirety.277 
However, it is interesting to note that although much focus is on the U.S. class action with 
opt-out system and monetary claims, the U.S. has other kinds of class actions, too. For in-
stance, FRCP Rule 23(d) allows opt-out class certification on partial issues, although this pro-
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cedure is only used infrequently.278 Moreover, U.S. statutes like Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Equal Pay Act (EPA) also 
have opt-in class actions for certain kinds of actions.279  
 
2. Incentives on Plaintiffs’ Side 
In the case of FRCP Rule 23 securities class action in the U.S., the incentive to make use of 
class action procedure seems to be mainly on the plaintiffs’ side. One reason is the existence 
of mandatory court awarded fees for the plaintiffs’ counsel.280 This is more of an incentive for 
the attorney or attorneys who represent the filing plaintiff rather than the individual plain-
tiffs.281 If the counsel succeeds in obtaining a certification of a class (of which the aggregated 
amount of all claims is sufficiently high), the counsel can expect to be awarded a considerable 
sum when the case settle.282  
The American Rule regarding litigation fee could also be considered to favor the plaintiff.283 
In the U.S., each side pays for its own litigation fees regardless of the outcome in a securities 
class action.284 Consequently the plaintiff does not have to take the possibility of paying for 
the inevitably incurred legal fees of the defendant in the event of losing the case into account 
when considering whether to file a claim or not.285 In practice, the plaintiff’s counsel will 
agree to represent the plaintiff in a class action, expecting court awarded remuneration when 
the case concludes.286  
This is not the case for Germany. The KapMuG is designed in a way that resembles an opt-in 
system (although it technically is something unique that cannot be classified as purely opt-
in).287 The aggregation effect of an opt-in system is far weaker than the opt-out system.288 
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Moreover, not only does the KapMuG not allow court-awarded fees contingent on the amount 
of the plaintiffs’ recovery, but contingent fee contracts are (generally) not allowed in Germa-
ny.289 So there is not much incentive for the plaintiffs’ attorneys to file for a KapMuG inter-
mediate proceeding.  
However, there may still be some incentive for the plaintiff to file for a KapMuG proceeding. 
In a KapMuG action, the court fee for each individual trial has to be paid when initially filing 
a claim and there is no extra fee when the case progresses to the model case procedure.290 The 
additional costs incurred during the model case procedure (e.g. expert expenses) are added to 
the total costs in the individual trials in proportion to the amount of each plaintiff's claim in 
the end.291 The plaintiffs do not have to pay the advance in costs for the expert expenses in the 
model case proceeding.292 This is quite different from the usual procedure, where the party 
making the motion is required to pay the advance in costs for the expenses of gathering evi-
dence, including the expenses of the expert appointed by the court.293 That means in a case 
where the expert expenses are high, the party with the burden to prove an element requiring 
high expenses (which will usually be the plaintiff) has an incentive to request a model proce-
dure. The loser of the case has to reimburse these costs at the end of the individual proceed-
ing.294 Because the litigation costs incurred during the model case procedure (including expert 
expenses) would have incurred even if the case was brought individually, the overall expected 
cost of litigation may be lower compared to the expected cost of an individual proceeding. In 
a KapMuG procedure, the expert expenses are distributed between all plaintiffs and each 
plaintiff has the duty to reimburse only when one loses.295 
When we look deeper in the KapMuG procedure, we should note that are two decisions to be 
made by all injured shareholders. The first decision is whether to file a securities fraud action 
at all or not, and the second decision is whether to request a KapMuG procedure or not. The 
first decision may be crucially influenced by the existence of the KapMuG for a plaintiff who 
does not have the money for the advance in costs for expert fees. This plaintiff will have more 
incentive to request a KapMuG procedure because such a plaintiff would probably be judg-
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ment proof anyway if the party loses in the final outcome.296 However, a party who has the 
resources to pay for the procedure, even if the outcome is a loss, only has the money value of 
the time for expert fee which has not been prepaid in the KapMuG procedure. This in turn 
should be weighed against the resources spent by the extra time the KapMuG procedure may 
have incurred.  
The other mechanism, which allows proportionate distribution of the expense among the los-
ers, will be an advantage which can be exploited indifferently by all parties. However, this is 
an incentive which is modest at best, as it only lowers the legal cost of the party, not the legal 
attorney. So this mechanism will not be likely to bring about the entrepreneurship mindset of 
a plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel in Germany, unlike the U.S. securities class action does in the 
U.S..297  
Some attention should also be brought to the incentives on the side of plaintiffs’ counsels. 
Usually, there is no extra payment for the plaintiff’s counsel when a case goes on to KapMuG 
intermediate proceeding in principle.298 So requesting the use of KapMuG procedure may not 
be welcome to the plaintiff’s counsel unless the counsel happens to be representing many 
plaintiffs with similar claims which cannot be joined together by other procedure.299  
 
3. Incentives on Defendants’ Side 
Will there be an incentive on the defendant’s side? Because settling an opt-out class action in 
the U.S. will make the dispute be settled for good (except for some individual plaintiffs who 
choose to opt out) without risking the cost of high litigation, there may be an incentive for the 
defendant to use an opt-out class action in theory.300 However, defendants will generally 
move to dismiss the case because PSLRA stays discovery pending any motion to dismiss.301   
It could be said that there is also some incentive to the defendant of Germany to opt for class 
action in KapMuG, because in a KapMuG procedure the issue is only a certain element of a 
claim which is fatal for the plaintiffs’ case, while the defendant may still go on disputing 
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plaintiffs’ claims in other grounds.302 However, usually it is the plaintiff who moves for 
KapMuG procedure in practice.303 A possible explanation for this phenomenon could be that 
the defendants are seeking tactical advantages by trying each case individually.304  
 
4. Incentives on Courts’ Side 
Lastly, the incentives on the courts’ side should be considered. In the U.S., because the peti-
tion for certifying class action is filed with the filing of the complaint.305 So, it is hard for the 
court to voice their opinion about the petition of class certification before the petition has 
been filed in an individual case. However, the Supreme Court has been narrowing the scope 
of Rule 10b-5 private right of action which could in theory deter those kind of actions from 
being filed.306 But statistics show that securities class actions filings have been quite steady 
over the years.307   
In Germany, if the court has decided that there will be a KapMuG intermediate proceeding, 
then all individual trials that are dependent on issues of the model procedure are suspended, 
regardless of whether the individual plaintiff opted in by filing a motion of request.308 Even 
those cases that are filed after the decision to proceed by the KapMuG procedure will be im-
mediately suspended.309 This effect will lower the workload of the court very much which is 
one of the reasons the KapMuG has been legislated in the first place.310 It may even be that 
the court could be willing to advise the plaintiff to file a request to use a KapMuG procedure, 
when the court estimates that there will be too many individual filings of action. This is an 
empirical question which the answer could be partially found by seeing at what point the re-
quest is filed by the plaintiff. KapMuG procedure goes into intermediate proceeding only if 
ten or more plaintiffs make a request for KapMuG procedure within six months of the first 
motion. If the plaintiffs start to file requests for KapMuG procedure only after 10 or more 
plaintiffs have individually filed a securities fraud action, this may be an indication that the 
court has urged the plaintiff to do so.  
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Opt-in class actions may be filed when the stakes are high enough. In the U.S., FLSA wage 
claims often generate an amount in controversy in excess of five million dollars which could 
attract the plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ attorneys to file for opt-in class action.311 In the Telekom-
case in Germany, there was a flood of securities fraud actions being filed even before the in-
troduction of the KapMuG. The average individual claim was about 5,900 EUR, which is an 
amount that is high enough to overcome the effects of “rational apathy” and move sharehold-
ers to sue even without a class action procedure in Germany.312 
 
C. Importing US Class Action to Germany? 
Assuming that U.S. opt-out class action system is needed for Germany, what are the obstacles 
for its implementation? There may be obstacles of political, legal and practical nature. 
 
I. Political Obstacles 
First of all, some consideration should be given to the political obstacles which would likely 
be encountered. As has been discussed, most securities class actions settle in the U.S. with the 
insurance companies paying all or most of the settlement payments because of D&O insur-
ance.313 In the cases where for some reason D&O insurances are not enough to cover the cost, 
the corporations mostly pay the settlement payments themselves.314 When corporations make 
payments to plaintiffs, the shareholders - who are the residual owners of the corporation - are 
essentially paying the price.315 Moreover, in the U.S. corporation buy the D&O insurance for 
their officers and directors,316 so the D&O insurance premiums are also in essence paid by the 
shareholders.317 Because of this mechanism, certain players of the capital market could active-
ly resist any legal change that might result in more active private enforcement. These players 
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could namely be (1) institutional investors, (2) long term investors, (3) controlling sharehold-
ers and even (4) the German government. 
 
1. Institutional Investors 
Many institutional investors who hold stocks in portfolios could object to class actions be-
cause they will potentially lose money due to the circularity problem.318 These investors who 
are not looking for private benefit or control may on the one hand be rationally reticent to 
engage in firm specific corporate issues for various reasons.319 Implementation of U.S. type 
class action system to Germany however may affect all listed corporation. For this reason, 
institutional investors as a whole may become more proactive and object to the implementa-
tion of U.S. style securities class action. 
 
2. Long-Term Investors 
More clear losers of the active enforcement through class actions could be the long term 
shareholders who do not hold stock in portfolios. For instance, there are employees, manag-
ers, or other small investors who buy and hold stocks for a long time for retirement.320  
In the U.S., only the party who has bought or sold the stock have standing to sue.321 In Ger-
many too, there has to be some kind of transaction during the time period of misinfor-
mation.322 Because of this reason, long term shareholders will most often be the ones who in 
the end will pay the price, as they will not have traded during the period at issue.323 
With the above in mind, the long term shareholders in Germany will most likely resist change 
to the current low private enforcement levels and some may have enough political influences 
to succeed in blocking any attempt to incorporate the U.S. style opt-out class action.  
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3. Controlling Shareholders 
Specific types of long term shareholders are the controlling shareholders. Controlling share-
holders will typically be holding on to shares for a long time, neither buying nor selling.324 
Considering the above, controlling shareholders who have large stakes as direct shareholders 
of a corporation, will pay the highest price. Moreover, because controlling shareholders hold a 
lot of stock in specific corporations, they will not be rationally apathetic. Although controlling 
stockholders may hold other corporations’ stocks in an attempt to diversify, it will be difficult 
to fully diversify away all firm specific risks, while holding controlling blocks of publicly 
traded corporations. So at least some of them may not want the U.S. class action type en-
forcement.325 
In the U.S., it may no longer be accurate to say that investors are dispersed.326 However, the 
percentage of public corporations with controlling shareholders is quite low, approximately 
less than 10 percent.327  
There are more corporations with controlling shareholders in Germany.328 The general influ-
ence of dispersed-ownership stockholders is relatively low and is only slowly increasing.329 
As of 2008, only 7% of the Germans hold shares as private individuals, while in comparison, 
50% of all households in the U.S. do. 330 There is a trend from more concentration to less con-
cerning shareholder compositions, with less and less interdependencies.331 It is however still 
safe to assume that due to the still existing entanglements in ownership, a powerfully large 
                                                
324 INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST., CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD 
& POOR’S 1500: A TEN YEAR PERFORMANCE AND RISK REVIEW 7 (2012) (finding that the average 
number of years since the current control mechanism of U.S. public held corporations with controlling share-
holder is approximately 24 years). 
325 John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229, 246 (2007) 
(asserting that the deterrent threat generated by the U.S. commitment to enforcement will disproportionately 
repel some issuers with controlling shareholders who find it more advantageous to consume the private benefits 
of control themselves than to maximize their firm’s share price). 
326 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Goldon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the 
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 874 (noting statistics that institutional investors 
held 50.6% of all U.S. public equities by 2009). 
327 INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST., CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD 
& POOR’S 1500: A TEN YEAR PERFORMANCE AND RISK REVIEW 3 (2012), http://irrcinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/FINAL-Controlled-Company-ISS-Report1.pdf (finding that 114 firms out of Standard 
& Poor 1,500 composite are controlled corporations in 2012). 
328 see the Report of the Monopoly Commission 2012/2013, Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten XX, Kapitel 
II: Stand und Entwicklung der Konzentration und Verflechtung von Großunternehmen, 208-214, for an overview 
over the Top 100 companies in Germany and their ownership structure. 
329 Höpner, Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen?, 25. 
330 Möllers, Effizienz als Maßstab des Kapitalmarktrechts, 208 AcP 1, 3 (2008). 
331 Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Deutschland AG in Auflösung, 1; Max-Planck-Institut für 
Gesellschaftsforschung, Kapitalverflechtungen in Deutschland 1996-2010. 
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part of the business world would heavily oppose an introduction of U.S. securities class ac-
tions due to the fear of falling prey to the mechanism described above. 
 
4. Government as controlling shareholder 
Another possible influential player with economic interest in the public stock market is the 
government. In the U.S., there was no government controlled corporation incorporated under 
state law which traded in the public market before 2008.332 This does not mean that there 
were no government controlled corporations in the U.S. history. The U.S. government have 
frequently chartered wholly owned corporation in the past, and some public traded business 
entities have special provisions in the charter giving some kind of control to the U.S. govern-
ment.333 It just means that there is not much history of U.S. government ownership of publicly 
trading corporation in private industry.334 
This is not the case in Germany. Although there are not too many government involvements 
in publicly traded companies, German public authorities do hold stock in a few major ones, 
for example: Fraport AG (51.35%),335 Deutsche Telekom AG (31.7%),336 Deutsche Post AG 
(21%),337 Volkswagen AG (20%),338 and Commerzbank AG (17.15%).339 As these participa-
tions are all long term, the Government could potentially be negatively affected by the mech-
anism described above.340  
                                                
332 J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 
283, 293 (2010). 
333 J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 
283, 286 (2010). 
334 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 
1293, 1297 (2011). 
335 20.01% are held by the City of Frankfurt am Main through its (100% directly owned) company “Stadtwerke 
Frankfurt am Main Holding GmbH”, see the City’s Report on Financial Involvements: Stadt Frankfurt am Main, 
Graphische Gesamtdarstellung der Beteiligungen 2014; the other 31.34% are directly held by the State of Hesse, 
see the State’s Report on Financial Involvements: Land Hessen, Unmittelbare Beteiligungen des Landes Hessen 
an privatrechtlichen und öffentlich-rechtlichen Unternehmen, 1. 
336 The Federal Republic of Germany holds 14.26% of the shares directly and 17.44% through the KfW (which 
is 80% owned by the Federal Republic and 20% owned by the States of Germany), see the Federal Report on 
Financial Involvements, Germany, Beteiligungsbericht des Bundes, 31. 
337 The Federal Republic of Germany holds 21% of the shares through the KfW, see the Federal Report on Fi-
nancial Involvements, Germany, Beteiligungsbericht des Bundes, 33. 
338 The State of Lower Saxony holds these shares through its company Hannoverschen Beteiligungsgesellschaft 
Niedersachen, see the State’s Report on Financial Involvements, Land Niedersachen, Beteiligungsbericht 2015, 
30. 
339 The shares are held through the federal FMS (Financial Markets Stability Fund) - a fund that was created in 
2008 in the wake of the financial crisis. It was mainly used to buy 100% of the shares of Hypo Real Estate Hold-
ing AG, which went bankrupt, see the Federal Report on Financial Involvements of Germany, Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Beteiligungsbericht des Bundes 2015, 46. 
340 See supra, Part III, II. 3. 1. a). 
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Yet even though the German Government may stand on the defendants’ side systematically, 
consequently losing more due to a higher level of private enforcement through securities class 
actions, it would be a long shot to assert that this would be an (official) reason as to why the 
government resists the introduction of a U.S. style class action. After all, it was the German 
government’s declared goal to increase the level of private enforcement.341 
 
II. Legal Obstacles 
In addition to the possible political obstacles described above, there are a few potential legal 
obstacles too. 
 
1. Filing Fee 
In the U.S., the filing fee for a class action in federal court is flat, currently at 350 dollars.342 
Relative to the amount at stake in a class action, the filing fee that the plaintiff or the plain-
tiff’s counsel has to bear is nominal.343  
In contrast, the filing fee for a claim in Germany is calculated by a formula that is a function 
of the amount at stake and the calculated fee has to be filed up front.344 If the amount at stake 
is calculated by not only the amount at stake for the plaintiff but the amount as a class, then it 
will not be economically feasible for a plaintiff to pay the filing fee of a class action.345  
However, this effect could be circumvented by introducing a flat filing fee for securities class 
actions in Germany. Although it is the norm in Germany that the filing fee is calculated based 
on the amount of the claim,346 there are already exceptions to this rule, i.e. flat fees for certain 
procedures.347 So it may be possible to make another exception to the rule. Another possibility 
would be capping the filing fee to the alleged damages of the lead plaintiff.348 Lastly, a system 
                                                
341 see the German government’s Memorandum of Explanation for the KapMuG, BT Drucks. 15/5091, 16. 
342 Deborah R Hensler, The United States of America, in THE COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGA-
TION 535, 539 (Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer & Magdalena Tulibacka eds., 2010). 
343 We thank Professor Fisch for pointing out this point to us.  
344 See § 3 para. 1, 2 GKG and § 6 para. 1 no. 1 GKG. 
345 Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 Law and Contemp. Probs. 167, 
171 (1997) (noting that filing fees and amount-in-controversy requirement may serve as entry barriers which 
prevent the litigation of some claims). 
346 See § 3 para. 1 GKG. 
347 For example, for having a court decision about the acceptance of an order of (civil) execution from a foreign 
court, the flat filing fee is 240.- EUR, regardless of the actual amount in question, see GKG Anl. 1 (zu § 3 Abs. 
2) Kostenverzeichnis, 1510. 
348 See Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, It’s for the Judges to Decide: Allocation of Trial Costs in Israel Report on 
Israel, in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 177, 183 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012) 
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could be introduced where a plaintiff files a claim first with the normal fees subsequently al-
lowing request class certification with an additional flat fee. Each of these mechanism may 
allow the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s counsel to file a class action without having to carry the 
filing fees of other plaintiffs. 
 
2. Fee Shifting Rule 
Each party pays for its own legal fees regardless of the outcome in the U.S. in contrast to 
Germany, where the loser pays for the winners cost in principle.349 Although the German fee 
shifting or “loser pays” rule may seem like an obstacle, it is not a high hurdle. When cases 
settle, each party pays for its own fees incurred until the time of the settlement unless party 
agree to a different arrangement.350 In addition to this, there is a cap on how much legal fees 
can be charged to the other party, i.e. only the “standard statutory fees” for attorneys can be 
shifted.351 The standard statutory fees are calculated with the help of the German Lawyer’s 
Remuneration Act (RVG) and are also (as a general rule) based on the amount at stake.352 In 
most cases however the lawyer will insist on working not on a static fee basis, but on hourly 
rates. Such agreements are possible pursuant to § 3a RVG and will most of the times exceed 
the statutory fees. The excess however will not be reimbursed under the loser pays rule.353 It 
means a plaintiff (or plaintiff’s counsel) that loses does not have to bear all of defendants’ 
legal fees. Moreover, the plaintiff can roughly estimate the amount of lawyer fees the plaintiff 
will have to reimburse to the defendant in case of a loss when deciding whether to sue.354 
However, it should be noted that there has to be some kind of a rule on calculating the amount 
at stake in a class action as it will be very difficult to make a calculation for the amount at 
                                                                                                                                                   
(explaining that although there is a possibility of change in regulation, courts usually required class action plain-
tiffs to pay court fees only with respect to their personal claim in Israel as of 2012). 
349 Compare Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney 
Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 327, 328-29 (2013) (“The American 
rule on attorney fees ordinarily requires parties litigating disputes to compensate their own attorneys regardless 
of the outcome.”) (footnote omitted), and Burkhard Hess & Rudolf Huebner, Cost and Fee Allocation in Ger-
man Civil Procedure, in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 151 (Mathias Reimann ed., 
2012) (“In German, the losing party must bear all statutory costs of the litigation in civil and commercial mat-
ters, including the costs incurred by the opponent and the costs for the taking of evidence.”). 
350 Burkhard Hess & Rudolf Huebner, Cost and Fee Allocation in German Civil Procedure, in COST AND FEE 
ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 151, 154 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012) (“If the parties of a settlement 
do not agree on the allocation of costs, each party bears its own costs and court costs are equally divided.”). 
351 See § 91 para. 2 sent. 1 ZPO. 
352 § 2 para. 1 RVG. 
353 See § 3a para. 1 sent. 3 RVG. 
354 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Em-
pirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 327, 328 (2013) (noting the predictability of 
lawyer fees in Germany). 
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stake for the whole class. If the amount at stake is calculated by the amount at stake for the 
lead plaintiff, which will be very small compared to the amount at stake as a class, then the 
fee shifting rule will not make much difference because the actual amount to be reimbursed 
will not be high. 
 
3. Contingent fee 
As we have seen, judge awarded fees to the plaintiffs’ counsel allow the counsel to represent 
plaintiffs on a contingent fee basis.355 This works as a factor for the plaintiff’s counsel to be 
an entrepreneur in the U.S..356 However, this is not the case in Germany. In Germany, contin-
gent fees are generally not allowed.357 The total ban has been somewhat alleviated in 2006 by 
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, which held that a flat-out ban on contingent 
fees is unconstitutional.358 Today, contingent fees are allowed in Germany, but only in a very 
limited scope, namely if no other funding is available for the plaintiff.359 This may potentially 
be a starting point for further reform. Germany could decide to allow contingent fee contracts 
(up to a limited amount) in the specific case of securities fraud actions.  
 
4. Lack of Discovery Process 
In the U.S., discovery is a major part of civil litigation which allows private enforcement.360 
But because Germany does not have a discovery system, it may be harder for the plaintiff to 
prove certain elements like scienter. However, this obstacle may be overcome by either (1) 
creating procedural rules to shift the burden of proof for certain elements like scienter to the 
defendant, or (2) getting rid of certain elements like scienter. This could leave elements that 
may be proven by evidence that is not closely guarded by the defendant.  
The German answer to the lack of a discovery stage in procedural law is mostly shifting the 
                                                
355 Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 Law and Contemp. Probs. 167, 
172 (1997). 
356 Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 Law and Contemp. Probs. 167, 
173 (1997). 
357 see § 49b para. 2 sent. 1 of the German Federal Lawyers’ Act [Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung (BRAO), as of 
12/21/2015, BGBl. III 1959; 303-8]. 
358 BVerfG, NJW 2007, 797. 
359 See § 4a para. 1 of the German Lawyer's Remuneration Act [Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz (RVG), as of 
12/21/2015, BGBl. I 2004, 718]; see also Wagner, 16 Theoretical Inq. L. 69, 99 (2015). 
360 Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Litigation Discovery and Corporate Governance: The Missing Story 
About the “Genius of American Corporate Law”, 63 Emory L.J. 1383, 1394 (2014) (“[P]rivate enforcement in 
the United States depends on the power that litigation discovery affords private attorney general to investigate, 
uncover, and reconstruct the facts and circumstances of corporate management in great detail.”) (footnote omit-
ted) (emphasis in original).  
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burden of proof in favor of the party that would have difficulties proving a certain element in 
front of the court. However, it should be kept in mind that shifting the burden of proof might 
not have the same effectiveness as a discovery system. The defendant can in turn shift back 
by producing only evidence that is favorable for his position.361 This again leaves the plaintiff 
blindsided, because in Germany there is no sanction for failing to reveal information (other 
than potentially losing the case).362 However, in the U.S., a party that refuses to disclose in-
formation during the discovery phase may be heavily sanctioned, including the plaintiff’s at-
torney or even the entire law firm.363 Lack of a discovery procedure thus can be a crucial ob-
stacle against effective securities litigation in Germany.  
 
5. Lack of Civil Juries  
Fact finding decisions made by civil juries are generally more unpredictable compared to the 
decisions of professional judges.364 Moreover, juries may be more favorable to investors al-
leging loss than to public corporation.365 So there could be more incentives to initiate a securi-
ties class action when civil juries are provided.366 While there are civil juries in the U.S., there 
are no civil juries in Germany.  
Yet because civil juries may make decisions that are generally more in favor of investors, this 
might incentivize meritless suits and open up securities fraud actions for abuse.367 Consider-
ing this, the lack of civil juries should not be considered an obstacle for introducing class ac-
tion in Germany in general, but rather as deterrence for meritless suits. 
 
6. Constitutional constraints 
As has been shown in full detail in Part I of this paper, the general idea of collective redress 
systems such as the class action face major constitutional constraints. A real bundling of cases 
through a class action can only be achieved to the detriment of the fundamental principles of 
                                                
361 See § 292 sent. 1 ZPO. 
362 Halberstam, 021 SUNY B.L.S.R.P., 48 (2015).   
363 Halberstam, 021 SUNY B.L.S.R.P., 48 (2015).   
364 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 200 (2015) (“The availability of juries in civil 
cases implies greater unpredictability of outcomes—and thereby increases the plaintiff’s attorney’s leverage”). 
365 Manning Gilbert Warren III, The U.S. Securities Fraud Class Action: An Unlikely Export to the European 
Union, 37 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1075, 1087 (2012). 
366 Manning Gilbert Warren III, The U.S. Securities Fraud Class Action: An Unlikely Export to the European 
Union, 37 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1075, 1086-87 (2012). 
367 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 295. 
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party control and the right to judicial access in German procedural law.368 As long as there is 
no movement away from these principles, this is perhaps the most relevant obstacle against an 
import of US class action to Germany.369 
 
III. Practical Obstacles - Proving Elements Using Expert Opinion  
Generally, a plaintiff should allege and prove certain elements which could include reliance, 
loss causation and damages to the plaintiff for the plaintiff to prevail in a misrepresentation 
action. In a securities litigation context, the plaintiff would resort to expert witness to prove 
these elements.370  
In the U.S., it is the practice that each party hires its own experts.371 Although there is a rule 
which allows the court to hire its own expert, most judges are reluctant to use that power.372 
So in the U.S., each party knows that there will be at least some experts who are willing to 
testify for its cause as long as there is some credibility to the expert and the case has some 
merits. On the other hand, each party knows that there will probably be two differing opinions 
of experts which is itself a risk. This risk may be a factor which incentivizes the parties to 
settle. 
However, this is not the case for Germany. Usually, German Courts appoint their own expert 
who will submit a written report of its findings with relevant opinions.373 The court will 
choose the expert from lists kept by the professional bodies, or a person known form the 
court’s past experience to be a reliable expert in the case where there is no such list.374 So the 
                                                
368 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 45. 
369 Halberstam, 021 SUNY B.L.S.R.P., 31 (2015).   
370 Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487,1488 (1996) 
(“Expert testimony is required to calculate damages, …”); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and 
the Law: Part II:Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 Am. L. Econ. Rev. 380, 397-400 (2002) (explaining 
expert’s use of event study in securities litigation to prove elements such as reliance and materiality). 
371 Faust F Rossi, The Law of Expert Witnesses in the United States: Past, Present and Future, in THE EXPERT 
IN LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 215 (D. Mark Cato ed., 1999) (“Any time a litigant believes his case 
will be aided by presenting an expert, he is likely to seek one out if it is economically feasible. If one side in 
litigation uses an expert on an issue, the other party is likely to reciprocate by finding an opposing expert”). 
372 Faust F Rossi, The Law of Expert Witnesses in the United States: Past, Present and Future, in THE EXPERT 
IN LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 215 (D. Mark Cato ed., 1999) (“Although trial judges have the power 
to appoint neutral experts, most judges are reluctant to substitute their choice for that of the parties.”). 
373 Volker Triebel & Heiko Plassmeier, The Use of Experts in Litigation and Arbitration in Germany, in THE 
EXPERT IN LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 155, 157 (D. Mark Cato ed., 1999). 
374 Volker Triebel & Heiko Plassmeier, The Use of Experts in Litigation and Arbitration in Germany, in THE 
EXPERT IN LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 155, 158 (D. Mark Cato ed., 1999). 
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parties have far less control over the expert who is appointed. Even if the party appoints an 
expert for itself, the expert will not be taken as impartial.375  
Although the cost of an expert hired by the party is also subject to the loser pays rule if the 
hiring of the expert is necessary,376 this is generally not the case.377  
For the reasons above, the plaintiff in Germany cannot provide a favorable expert witness 
with a reasonable certainty compared to the plaintiff in the U.S., so it is riskier for the plaintiff 
or plaintiff’s counsel to sue as a class action in Germany. This practice might also deter the 
plaintiff or the plaintiff’s counsel from deciding to sue for class action. 
It should be further noted that because of the current practice of using financial technics as 
event studies is very important in the U.S. style class action,378 and because experts have 
some discretion over choices such as defining announcement date or considering the length of 
the announcement period,379 loss of control over experts is also a risk to the parties because 
each party may not know how the expert chosen by the court will decide on such factors. 
However, it could be argued that the German practice in expert evidence would just work as 
deterrence to meritless suits, because a favorable decision for a party cannot be “bought” by 
hiring a specific expert. The court appointed experts will be far more independent and thus be 
committed to the truth.  
It should be noted that the German system allows for the parties to ask opinions of the expert 
chosen by the court, so the parties do have access to the expert (although limited compared to 
the U.S.) even if the expert is chosen by the court.380 
 
 
                                                
375 Volker Triebel & Heiko Plassmeier, The Use of Experts in Litigation and Arbitration in Germany, in THE 
EXPERT IN LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 155, 157 (D. Mark Cato ed., 1999) (“Where the parties ap-
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376 Burkhard Hess & Rudolf Huebner, Cost and Fee Allocation in German Civil Procedure, in COST AND FEE 
ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 151 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012) (“The reimbursable costs for the 
taking of evidence include not only court appointed expert witnesses, but also expert witnesses hired by the pre-
vailing party as long as the hiring of the expert was necessary as provided by sec. 91 (1) ZPO.”). 
377 Volker Triebel & Heiko Plassmeier, The Use of Experts in Litigation and Arbitration in Germany, in THE 
EXPERT IN LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 155, 157 (D. Mark Cato ed., 1999) (“The costs of appointing 
a party expert will not normally be reimbursed to the appointing party even though it wins the case entirely.”). 
378 Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 895, 918 
(2013) (“Indeed, courts have frequently required an event study or similar empirical analysis.”) (footnote omit-
ted). 
379 Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 
Am. L. Econ. Rev. 141, 144-45 (2002) (explaining the difficulty of defining announcement date and announce-
ment period in an event study). 
380 Volker Triebel & Heiko Plassmeier, The Use of Experts in Litigation and Arbitration in Germany, in THE 
EXPERT IN LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 155, 157 (D. Mark Cato ed., 1999) (“The expert gives his 
opinion on the issues identified in one party’s application for appointment of an expert and/or the court order of 
appointment.”). 
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IV. Conclusion 
There are many differences between Germany and the U.S. which would not allow U.S. style 
class actions to be incorporated to function as in the U.S. However, it is hard to know how 
much each of these differences affects the likelihood of a successful implementation. Some or 
all of the factors may work together as an obstacle, or certain difference in system may be the 
crucial hurdle. Finding the optimal mechanism may be an empirical question to which an an-
swer could be found by comparing the situation in other and different legal regimes. Different 
countries may have different sets of mechanisms with different results.381 However, by identi-
fying those differences, one could find solutions which may be different as to the form but 
similar as to the function.  
 
D. Enhancing the US Securities Class Action System 
Some mechanisms found in Germany may serve to reform the current class action system in 
the U.S. In this part, we will discuss some mechanisms of Germany, which could be consid-
ered in the U.S. context. 
 
I. Civil Juries 
As have seen above, civil juries may incentivize meritless suits and open up opportunities to 
abuse securities fraud actions.382 Because defendants may predict decisions made by judges 
somewhat more accurately compared to decisions made by civil juries, the defendants may 
have less pressure to settle without civil juries.383 Moreover, jurors may be less capable at 
understanding statistical evidences.384 As we have seen above not many securities class action 
actually go to trial,385 so the chance of an individual juror to actually experience statistical 
evidence is very low. Judges, on the other hand, are more likely to be more comfortable with 
                                                
381 For instance, only 12 securities class action cases have been filed in Korean courts as of February 2016 since 
the enactment of Securities-related Class Action Act in 2005 which is an opt-out type class action regime like the 
U.S. Korea allows contingency fee arrangement like the U.S., but has a loser pay rule system like Germany. See 
generally, Benjamin Lee, The not (yet) perfect implementation of securities class action in Korea (unpublished 
Working Paper, 2016).   
382 Bergmeister, KapMuG, 295. 
383 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 200 (2015). 
384 DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING 145 (2012) (“Third, most jurors do not use statistical 
information in an optimal fashion, tending to underweight it relative to the impact it should have according to the 
Bayesian model, and fail to combine probabilities in an ideal manner.”) 
385 RENZO COMOLLI & SVETLANA STARYKH, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: 2014 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 36 (2015) 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2015/PUB_2014_Trends_0115.pdf. 
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statistical evidence, not only because judges are more likely to be a repeat players of securi-
ties class action but also because statistical evidence such as event study is used at the early 
stage of the litigation process.386 For these reasons, the U.S. securities class action might im-
prove if civil juries are replaced with professional judges.387 
 
 
II. Fee Shifting Rule 
As we have seen, the loser pays in Germany.388 While this rule may work as a hurdle for the 
plaintiff to aggressively file a class action, it also may have certain merits when compared to 
the American rule. For instance, the plaintiff may try to impose cost on the defendant while 
economizing its own cost, thus forcing the defendant to settle even though there is not enough 
merit in the U.S. system.389 Although whether the loser pays rule deters frivolous suits more 
or not compared to the American rule is still debatable,390 it would be safe to assume that the 
incentive to make the other party incur litigation cost will generally be lower in a loser pays 
system.391  
Moreover, as we have seen, there is a cap in the German fee shifting rule which can be calcu-
lated ex ante.392 If there is no cap on fee shifting, there will be a chilling effect on the plaintiff 
who will likely spend less on litigation compared to the defendant in a securities class ac-
tion.393 The cap allows to mitigate the chilling effect.394 Also, the plaintiff can roughly esti-
                                                
386 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH, RULE 10B-5 SECURITIES-FRAUD LITIGA-
TION 355 (2015) (“An expert may be able to perform the necessary event study at class certification and 
demonstrate common issues, such as reliance and loss causation”). 
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See Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39 Del. J. Corp. L. 751, 769-88 
(2015) (discussing legal issues that could be raised about mandatory arbitration clause in bylaws). The right to 
jury trial may be alienated by consenting to the arbitration contract. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, 
Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waiver of Constitutional Rights, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 167, 
169 (2004). Interestingly, the standard for a legally acceptable consent to arbitration in the case law of the U.S. 
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388 Burkhard Hess & Rudolf Huebner, Cost and Fee Allocation in German Civil Procedure, in COST AND FEE 
ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 151 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012). 
389 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 165 (2015). 
390 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An 
Empirical Study of Public Company Contract, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 327, 334-39 (2013) (introducing conflicting 
theories about the effects of fee shifting rule). 
391 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 165 (2015). 
392 See § 91 para. 2 sent. 1 ZPO. 
393 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 165 (2015). 
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mate the amount he will have to pay to defendant in case of a loss before deciding to go for-
ward.395 However, for this system to work in the U.S., there should be a rule with a formula to 
calculate the cap on fees allowed to be shifted. This may or may not be a function of the 
amount at stake for the plaintiff, or the class as a whole.396 
 
III. Conclusion 
There is much active discussion to reform the U.S. securities class action as we have seen in 
Part II. While the German civil procedure system has some merits which could be considered 
to improve U.S. securities class action, it cannot address the core issue being debated in the 
U.S., since each system has its distinct characteristics. With this in mind, we will address the 
role of opt-out class action on deterring fraud in the German context. 
 
E. Deterring Corporate Fraud in Germany  
As we have seen in Part II, it is the practice in the U.S. when a securities class actions settles, 
D&O insurance companies covers the costs with the corporation indemnifying the individual 
directors and officers. The process is quite different in Germany. In Germany, the individual 
person who is responsible for the misrepresentation is typically not a party of the securities 
action. When executive bodies of a corporation breach their duties by violating disclosure 
obligations on the primary or secondary market, they are liable.397 In Germany (as well as 
Switzerland and Austria), this liability however generally exists only towards the corporation 
itself and only in very rare exceptions directly towards shareholders or third parties.398  
 
I. Managerial Liability of Securities Litigation in Germany: Law in Book 
Because this practice has to do with the German substantive law, a brief explanation is in or-
der. In Germany, there is a very strong differentiation between liability for failure to disclose 
                                                                                                                                                   
394 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 165 (2015). 
395 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Em-
pirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 327, 328 (2013). 
396 For instance, Korean Securities-related Class Action Act has a formula with a function of amount at stake for 
the whole class with a fixed cap of 50,000,000 won. See Benjamin Lee, The not (yet) perfect implementation of 
securities class action in Korea (unpublished Working Paper, 2016).   
397 Hopt, WM 2013, 101 (108). 
398 Hopt, WM 2013, 101 (108). 
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material information on primary and on secondary market.399 For liability on the primary 
market there is a multitude of statutory bases, namely (1) prospectus liability pursuant to the 
German Securities Prospectus Act (Wertpapierprospektgesetz - WpPG400) with a total of five 
statutory bases, (2) prospectus liability pursuant to the German Asset Investment Act (Ver-
mögensanlagegesetz - VermAnlG401) with a total of three statutory bases, (3) prospectus liabil-
ity pursuant to § 306 of the German Capital Investment Act (Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch - 
KAGB402), (4) prospectus liability pursuant to general civil law and (5) liability for faulty of-
fer documents pursuant to § 12 of the German Securities Purchase and Acquisition Act 
(Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz - WpÜG403).404 
The secondary market for securities is mainly governed by the German Securities Trading Act 
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz - WpHG405).406 The most relevant liability norms are §§ 37b, 37c 
WpHG, which provide a basis for claims against (only) the corporation because of failure to 
disclose or faulty disclosure of material information by means of ad-hoc publicity.407 
Managerial liability on the other hand is divided into internal and external liability.408 In this 
context, internal liability means liability towards the corporation as a legal entity and external 
liability means - direct - liability towards shareholders or third parties.409 External liability is 
very uncommon in Germany.410 This is caused by a lack of statutory basis for such claims. 
There are only very limited possibilities to bring an action against a manager pursuant to gen-
eral civil contract or tort law statutes of the German Civil Code and they generally only apply 
if the manager acted willfully.411 In 2004, there was an initiative to institute a more severe 
managerial liability through the introduction of a “Capital Market Information Liability Act" 
(Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz - KapInHaG412), which would enable shareholders 
                                                
399 Stübinger, Teilnehmerhaftung bei fehlerhafter Kapitalmarktinformation in Deutschland und den USA, 16, 71. 
400 Wertpapierprospektgesetz (WpPG), as of 11/20/2015, BGBl. I 2005, 1698. 
401 Vermögensanlagegesetz (VermAnlG), as of 11/22/2015, BGBl. I 2011, 2481. 
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19 for a comprehensive overview. 
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410 see Pregler, Der Selbstbehalt des Vorstands, 50, asserting that external liability (towards shareholders and 
third parties) made up only 20-32% of the total liability risk of the manager. 
411 Pregler, Der Selbstbehalt des Vorstands, 64-78. 
412 see the “Discussion Proposal” of the Act, BMI, Diskussionsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der 
Haftung für falsche Kapitalmarktinformationen (Kapitalmarktinformationshaftungsgesetz - KapInHaG), NZG 
2004, 1042 (1042-1051). 
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to sue the manager directly more easily.413 The initiative however was heavily opposed by 
scholars and the business world, so it was eventually dropped.414 
Other possible enforcers are the general assembly (with a simple majority vote) or a minority 
of shareholders (holding at least 1% or 100,000 EUR in shares) through a derivative suit.415 
However, derivative suits are quite uncommon in Germany.416 This leaves the corporation to 
claim liability to its managers. And claims that the corporation has against its managers are as 
a general rule to be brought by the supervisory board.417 As to this liability, the substantive 
law of Germany is quite strict as the standard for managers to be liable for violating duty of 
care to the corporation is negligence.418 Although Germany has adopted its own version of the 
Business Judgment Rule, it gives less protection to German managers compared to the U.S. 
counterparts.419 Moreover, when a director is found to be personally liable to the corporation 
for violating duty of care, then the directors are liable to compensate the corporation fully.420 
 
II. D&O Insurance and Managerial Liability in Germany 
However, German managers are not without protection. In Germany, D&O insurance (which 
was first introduced in Germany in 1986421), is the norm (at least for publicly traded corpora-
tions) although it is not mandatory.422 The corporation pays for the insurance coverage for its 
managers as a group, so the policy is priced by the D&O insurance corporation considering 
the risks of all board members and executives as an aggregate.423 But in order to prevent the 
existence of D&O insurances from incentivizing managerial misbehavior, § 93 para. 2 sent. 3 
AktG asserts that at least 10% (at least 1.5 times the fixed annual salary) of the claim have to 
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be borne by the manager personally.424 Managers may privately insure for the remaining 
10%.425  
Does the supervisory board enforce actively on the mangers? It is difficult to answer this 
question. There is not much publicly available data on how many claims are brought against 
managers. Corporations do not have a duty to disclose such information under German law 
and have no interest in doing so because of the negative publicity.426  
Studies assert that supervisory boards are reluctant to sue the managers.427 The reason for this 
may the fact that the supervisory board fears that their own breach of duty of care may surface 
during the process of enforcement against managers.428 Even if the supervisory board is not 
legally liable, because it is the supervisory board who appoints the managers, the supervisory 
board would still not want to risk being shown to be responsible for the misconduct of the 
managers. 429  However, other studies suggest differently. For example, studies show that 
16.67% of all D&O insurance contracts where at least once relied on during a time period of 
10 years.430 Another one estimates that German courts hold approximately 6,000 manager 
liability actions with 2 or 3 defendants on average.431 The study also estimates that about 60% 
of the payout by the insurance company is used to pay the fees for the lawyers.432  
Although, it is hard to find conclusive empirical evidence on this point, it is possible that to-
day the supervisory boards are more aggressively filing suits against the managers.433 In Ger-
many, the Federal Supreme Court held that the decision whether to bring a damages claim 
against members of the executive board is not subject to the business judgment of the supervi-
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sory board.434 So, the supervisory board may have to file and pursue a claim against the man-
agers.435 
If there are indeed active filings of the supervisory board against managers, then why do we 
not see many court decisions in Germany? The reason could be the same reason as in the 
U.S., that is most cases are either being dismissed or settled.436  
There are some possible rationales for the supervisory board to opt for settlement in such a 
case. The first rationale seems to be the fee shifting rule. The corporation may settle because 
of the possibility of paying for the legal fees in case the corporation loses.437 But because 
there is a  cap on the amount of fee which may be shifted in Germany, and because the rule 
regarding the manager’s duty of care violation is strict, the supervisory board will have less 
reason to fear defeat.  
Secondly, the corporation may opt to settle to keep the negative information out of the 
press.438 Since court decisions have more chances of being accessed by the public compared 
to the settlement, the corporation may want to settle rather than pursue the litigation. This 
may be something that can be made as a business decision. However, although the company 
may be able to keep the details of the case from the public by settling the case, it is not clear 
whether settling the case will allow to keep the entire facts from the market, let alone the fact 
that there has been a case. 
Another rationale has to do with the current D&O insurance practice in Germany. As have 
seen above, currently German D&O insurance is a group insurance in the sense that the exec-
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utive board and the supervisory board is insured by the same policy.439 When managers are 
sued by the corporation headed by the supervisory board, the managers may retaliate by giv-
ing third party notice to the individual supervisory board members alleging liability of the 
supervisory board member.440 When the supervisory board risks being sued, the supervisory 
board has to consider the possibility of the bucket being depleted when the supervisory board 
needs the policy at a later date.441 Although this problem may directly affect the incentive of 
the supervisory board to settle, there is a proposal to solve this problem by keeping the insur-
ance of the executive board and the supervisory board separate.442 By keeping the insurance 
policy of the supervisory board separate from the policy of managers, it will be possible to 
allow the supervisory board to pursue the case without being tempted to settle.443 
 
III. Implementation of US Style Class Action and Manager Misconduct Deterrence 
As we have seen, securities litigation is not common in Germany compared to the U.S. What 
would happen if U.S. style class action is implemented? Although there are differences in 
systems which may lead to different results as seen above, it may be possible to incentivize 
the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney to file more securities class actions. Because the man-
agers are not a party to the securities class action in Germany, the case will not be resolved 
with the corporation indemnifying the managers like in the U.S. 
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Because of the duty of the supervisory board to file claims against managers for violation of 
their duties, and because of the rule not allowing the corporation to cover the managers in full 
by D&O insurance in Germany,444 there may actually be deterrence effects to the manager’s 
conducts. Moreover, there may still be some deterrence effect even if the corporation ends up 
settling with the managers, as the manager will be paying from his pocket in the form of a 
deductible or private insurance policy.445  
 
F. Conclusion 
It is hard to predict whether U.S. style class action will work in Germany. There are many 
possible obstacles. There may be political obstacles which resist the implementation at all. 
There are legal obstacles which may act as barriers to implementation such as constitutional 
constraints, or which may act as barriers to use in practice such as lack of discovery system as 
we have seen above. Yet we also find German legal rules which show some attributes that 
may allow the U.S. securities class action to deter the misconduct of managers more effective-
ly.  
However, the actual effect on deterrence may give rise to a new problem which we do not 
address here, that is whether the U.S. style securities class action will work as an over deter-
rence mechanism if implemented.446 This is an issue that will have to be addressed with spe-
cific context at a later date. 
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